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"Money Can't Buy Me Love": A Contrast Between
Damages in Family Law and Contract
Margaret F. Brinig*
"'Cause, I don't care too much for money,
Money can't buy me love. "
-John Lennon (1964).
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As my contribution to this symposium in David's honor, I submit the law and
economics section of the damages chapter of our joint enterprise, Understanding
Contracts. Because of David's failing health, my own involvement with the publisher
never reached contract stage.' The chapter concludes with a problem that illustrates some
of the intricacies of mixing family law and contract. David and I grappled for some time
with the answer to the problem, coming at it from our different points of view. On one
occasion, David, with a twinkle, told me there was only one place where I was
"absolutely wrong." So here is our attempt to fuse two disciplines, followed by my
analysis of why we had such problems (and such fun) doing it.
The family law problem does not illuminate every single part of an exploration of
damages or every aspect of damages that might apply to family transactions. I leave that
task for another time. It does, however, illustrate problems with predicting and planning
for the future, problems that plague all contracts, but that make use of contract analogies
(or any other theory) particularly frustrating in family law. I suggest that the enhanced
* Edward A. Howry Professor of Law, University of Iowa. Many thanks to Herbert Hovenkamp for his
generous suggestions, as well as to Chad Sampson, who graduated in 2002 and who labored for three years on
Understanding Contracts, and to Nicholas Keppel, my able research assistant, who took on this special project.
1. Before he became too ill to get much academic writing accomplished, David and I completed two
chapters. The first was a general introduction to contracts while the second, the subject of this essay, concerned
contract damages. My particular plan from the outset was to provide a law and economics approach to each
topic presented earlier in the chapter. (I was also supposed to provide a fresh look at the writing David, or David
and Alan Widiss, who died in late February of 2001, had already drafted, and to make sure citations and
examples were current.)
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earning cases featured here be analogized to a particular kind of commercial contract, the
sort involving specific investments needed not only by the contracting parties but also by
the economy as a whole.
I. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF (COMMERCIAL) CONTRACT DAMAGES
In section 13.01 of Understanding Contracts, we set forth the general goal of
contract damages: to put aggrieved parties in as good a position (to the extent money can)
as they would have been in had the other party performed as promised, subject to certain
limitations (the aggrieved party should mitigate and avoid harms, while damages should
be reasonably foreseeable). 2 If one thinks carefully about this goal, one should realize it
has aspects that are both forward-looking ("reasonably foreseeable") and backward-
looking (limitations on what turn out to be losing contracts). The goal speaks directly
only to the current contract and not to future dealings between the parties or to contracts
in general.
Lawyer-economists see the goal, and therefore the aspects, of contract damages
somewhat differently. Most of their writing is more concerned with forward-looking
aspects and with shaping the behavior of future contract-makers and writers3 than with
what transpired after the contract was made. Some of these academics (for there are few
judges who are adherents of the school,4 and fewer practicing attorneys) also claim that
an ideal system of contract law would promote getting the goods (or services) in the
hands of those who value them most,5 regardless of whether such movement of resources
involves the incidental ("efficient") breach of an existing contract. 6 Others of the school
place more value on the ability of contract-makers to be secure that the promised duties
will be carried out.
7
The law and economics writers agree that remedies for breach affect incentives,
8
although they may disagree about what those incentives should be.9 Followers of the law
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a) (1981); U.C.C. § 1-16(1) (1987).
3. For the distinction between backward- and forward-looking theories, see Avery Katz, Reflections on
Fuller and Perdue's "The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages ": A Positive Economic Framework, 21 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 541, 544-45 (1988).
4. The exceptions whose opinions flavor current contracts case books are Judges Richard Posner and
Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See, e.g., N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County
Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner J.), reprinted in STEPHEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT
LAW 570-75 (2d ed. 2001); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J.), reprinted
in BURTON, supra at 68-74.
5. Katz, supra note 3, at 557-60.
6. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 118-20 (4th ed. 1992) (discussing cases in
which the breaching party will be better off paying the other party than continuing with the contract); Ian
Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REv. 947 (1982) [hereinafter Macneil,
Efficient Breach] (discussing fallacies in the theory of breach of contract); Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of
Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974) (opining that contracts are not so much discrete as relational).
7. Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 20 (1989).
8. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (suggesting that default rules are chosen to give at least one party to
the contract the incentive to contract around the default rule and therefore to chose the contract provisions they
prefer).
9. Friedmann, supra note 7, at 20 (stating that a promisor is generally bound to perform contract
promises unless he or she obtains a release from the promisee); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
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and economics school, like economists in general, make simplifying assumptions about
people who make contracts. Though the assumptions may seem unrealistic and abstract,
by varying the assumptions one at a time, economists hope to learn something about what
happens in the real world of contracts. The goal is fourfold: (1) to encourage parties to
create contracts that will leave at least one of the parties better off and neither party worse
off;10 (2) to encourage parties to write contracts that will cause the parties to perform
when it is efficient for them to do so; (3) to encourage efficient performance of valid
contracts; and (4) to enforce contracts in ways that advance the preceding three goals. In
actual practice, this way of looking at contract remedies results in damage awards looking
much like, if not identical to, the damages sections of other contracts monographs. In
some cases, because of the emphasis on creating and maintaining incentives, and
therefore focusing on earlier periods rather than on ensuing events, the law and
economics result may be quite different.
A. Goal One. Encouraging All Profitable Contracts
Encouraging profitable contracts involves two economic propositions: that of
"Pareto optimality" and that of the theory of search.I1 According to the first proposition,
people ought to undertake transactions (contracts) whenever both will be made better off
or at least one of them will be made better off and the other no worse off than at the
start.12 The second proposition, popularized by economist George Stigler, is that people
will search for contracting parties until the cost of search begins to exceed the possible
benefit that could be gained from the contract. 13 This search principle is related to the
first proposition because it sets a limit for contracts in the world. At some point (for some
LAW 107 (3d ed. 1986) (stating that if a promisor's profits from breach exceed the loss to promisee, breach is to
be permitted or encouraged on the ground it leads to maximization of resources).
10. While this might seem obvious, some scholars suggest that people might agree to "bad" deals. See,
e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993); Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive
Theory of Contract: From Feminist Dilemmas to a Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law,
146 U. PA. L. REv. 1235, 1236-37 (1998) (suggesting because of power dynamics, the least powerful party may
choose to do something over which she is, at best, deeply conflicted); Katherine K. Baker, Gender, Genes, and
Choice: A Comparative Look at Feminism, Evolution, and Economics, 80 N.C. L. REv. 465, 483 (2001)
(feminists should be suspicious of parsimonious models relying on autonomy and choice preferences that are
stable); W. Bradley Wendel, Mixed Signals: Rational-Choice Theories of Social Norms and the Pragmatics of
Explanation, 77 IND. L.J. 1, 1 (2002) (describing the movement in law and economics to integrate findings from
empirical social science to explain why rational actors follow rules that have costs that outweigh their benefits);
Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L.
REV. 669, 688 n.51 (1979) (criticizing Posner's "rationalism"); Robin West, Submission, Choice, and Ethics: A
Rejoinder to Judge Posner, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1449, 1450 (1986) (using the characters of Franz Kafka to
illustrate the problems); cf Steven Shavell & Louis Kaplow, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REv. 966
(2001) (arguing that legal policies should depend exclusively on their effects on an individual's welfare because
rules based on fairness tend to make individuals worse off). But see Joseph William Singer, Something
Important in Humanity, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 103, 130 (2002) (criticizing Shavell and Kaplow by
objecting to how they look at everything as costs and benefits and ignore fairness).
11. George Stigler, The Economics ofInformation, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 216 (1961).
12. See ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND THE MARKET ECONOMY 108 (2000) (discussing "Pareto
optimality").
13. See Stigler, supra note 11, at 216; POSNER, supra note 6, at 111-12.
2002]
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earlier than for others), we stop looking for better deals and just accept an offer.14
The point of these two propositions when it comes to contract damages is to get
people to reveal information enabling others to see whether it is worth dealing with
them. 15 How truthful, accurate, and complete the information must be provides another
set of questions for which developed contract law gives answers. Many of these questions
and answers are taken up in the discussions of contract formation concerning mistake and
fraud. Another related avenue of inquiry, better dealt with elsewhere, concerns who
should be able to make contracts (capacity) and what the proper subjects of contracts
should be. The discipline of law and economics was developed around (and thus claims
to have the most value in answering) questions of commercial contracts. 1 6
B. Goal Two. Encouraging The Efficient Amount of Writing
The point of requiring writings that will encourage performance also involves
several economic principles. The first (and what many law and economics writers
consider the most critical for contract law) is that in writing contracts the parties allocate
risks of loss and gain. 1 7 The second, related to the idea that people will continue to search
14. See, e.g., Juliet P. Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, Moral Hazard, and Sunk Costs: A Default
Rule for Precontractual Negotiations, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 621 (1993) (illustrating offer acceptance when costs
get too high).
15. See, e.g., Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach
of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 284 (1991) (limiting recoverable damages
to foreseeable loses encourages contracting parties to reveal their true costs).
16. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, II BELL J. ECON. 466 (1980)
(discussing how chosen damage measures influence the behavior of parties who have entered a contract);
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE
L.J. 1261, 1263-64 (1980) (suggesting that liability or damage rules induce contracting parties to adapt their
behavior in ways that affect social welfare).
17. Compare Nicolet Instrument Corp. v. Lendquist & Vennum, 34 F.3d 453, 456 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner,
J.) ("It is not a novel idea that an essential function of contracts is to allocate particular risks to the parties best
able to bear them.") (citing OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 300 (1881)); Murray v. Abt
Assoc., Inc., 18 F.3d 1376, 1378 (7th Cir. 1994) (Easterbrook, J.) ("Respect for the parties' autonomy in
shaping their arrangements, and for the allocation of risks they selected, mean that a court ought not find in a
letter such as Stellwagen's the very promise the more elaborate Proposed Term Sheet withheld.") (citing 1 E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.8, at 181-86 (1990)), with J.F. McKinney & Ass. Ltd. v. Gen. Elec. Inv.
Corp, 183 F.3d 619, 622-23 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J.):
The documents exchanged between M&A and GEl did not by any stretch of the imagination
reveal how the parties allocated the risk that interest rates would change before the expiration of
the option. Asking a jury to supply its own answer would be no better than a coin flip, and we are
confident that Illinois law does not entitle a party in M&A's position to ask a jury for the sort of
commitment it did not obtain from its negotiating partner.
See also Cont'l Bank N.A. v. Everett, 964 F.2d 701, 705 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.) ("People write things
down in order to assign duties and allocate risks-functions vital to economic life yet defeated if courts prefer
hypothetical bargains over real ones."); see generally Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-
Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984) (suggesting that the first way to
assess a contract's performance is understanding and creating rules for economic systems is to focus on ex ante
analysis); Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 650 (1984)
(explaining how agency costs can be reduced through residual ownership by managers and the dividends the
ownership produces); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Risk Sharing Through Breach of Contract Remedies, 12 J. LEGAL
STUD. 427 (1983) (arguing that awarding lust profits interferes with the efficient allocation of risk between
parties); Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2005, 2007
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for better contracts so long as an additional search will probably be profitable, is that
people will negotiate terms and reduce them to writing when it makes sense for them to
do so. 18 This is called the critical risk allocation principle and means that when things
break down later, judges will ask which party took that particular risk. 19 In the absence of
the risks being spelled out in writing, someone will have to allocate risk for the parties,
and lawyer-economists will usually allocate risk, in order of preference, to the party (1)
that could control the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the problem, 20 (2) with the most
information about the situation (or who reasonably could have obtained it), 2 1 and (3) that
could best purchase insurance to cover the risk.22 The second principle requires that
people spell out their intentions in writing whenever it makes sense for them to do so.
Generally speaking, the more complex the contract, the more the terms that will have to
be spelled out.23 At some point though, the parties' affairs will be so complicated that
they will stop relying upon written contracts and rely instead upon the structural or
relational aspects of their dealings.24 Because they want to encourage people to think
(1987) (stating that parties enter into long-term contracts only after considering alternative methods for
achieving their objectives).
18. POSNER, supra note 6, at 92-93; ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 289
(1988); David Chamy, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH.
L. REv. 1815 (1991).
19. See, e.g., Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 609 (7th Cir. 1993). Judge Posner stated:
They certainly don't have to grant such benefits in perpetuo. If they did so in the past, not
anticipating the recent rise in health costs, they should not expect the courts to bail them out by
undoing the contractually determined allocation of risk on the question. Courts do not sit to relieve
contract parties of their improvident commitments, except within the limited dispensation conferred
by the doctrine of impossibility, not here invoked.
Id.
20. POSNER, supra note 6, at 119; RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 141 (5th ed. 1998);
Douglas G. Baird, The Law and Economics of Contract Damages, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND
ECONOMICS 49, 60 (Eric Posner ed., 2000) (discussing "reasonably foreseeable" damages and the rule of
Hadley v. Baxendale).
21. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 124-25, 138-39 (1987).
22. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation
Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and A Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 554,
578 (1977).
23. Charles Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089 (1981)
(describing how, in complex relational contracts, many terms will need to be spelled out).
24. Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REv. 1225, 1248-49
(1998). Scott & Scott explain:
In relational contexts, where the future contingencies are complex and uncertain, the classical
model of contract fails to capture the dynamic and interrelated functions of norms and legal rules,
and of informal and formal methods of contract enforcement. Parties to such relational contracts
are incapable of reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations.
Definitive and legally binding commitments may be impractical because the parties are unable to
identify in advance uncertain future conditions and specify the complex adaptations required of
each, or because they are unable to verify violations of the contractual obligation to third parties.
Relational contracts thus create unique, interdependent relationships in which unknown
contingencies, the intricacy of the required responses, and the inability to verify nonperformance
prevent the specification and enforcement of legal standards of performance.
Id. (citing Goetz & Scott, supra note 23, at 1092). Goetz and Scott argue that even in relational contracts,
parties will be required to exert the "effort necessary to maximize the joint net product flowing from the
2002]
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their contracts through carefully in advance and because the written agreement will be so
important for sorting things out at a later date, 25 law and economics writers support the
parole evidence rule, which disallows introduction of discussions not reduced to writing
that logically should have been. Law and economics writers also provide descriptions of
when contract terms should be left incomplete2 6 and how these "gaps" should best be
filled to accomplish what the parties would have wanted at the beginning. 2 7 Thus, there is
a good bit of writing about incomplete and "relational" contracts generally and quite a bit
about default terms.
28
C. Goal Three. Encouraging Performance of Efficient Contracts
In the first flush of law and economics scholarship, writers suggested that promisees
would be equally happy with continuing a contract as undertaken or receiving damages
from the other party that would give them the profit contemplated by the original deal
plus the costs associated with the "hassle" of recontracting. 2 9 Promisors would be happier
because they could get a better (higher or lower, depending upon whether the promisor
was the seller or buyer) price from a third party. The third party, who more highly valued
the good or service under contract or who could provide the good or service at lower cost,
would also be happier given the so-called "efficient breach." 30 However, efficient breach
contractual relationship" and will have to assume necessary risks. Goetz & Scott, supra note 23, at 1149.
25. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685,
1687-89 (1976) (arguing that if contracting parties know of arbitrariness of judicial decisions, "they will adjust
their activities in advance to take account of them").
26. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner. Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (discussing how lawmakers should create rules of the game within which
contracting parties can best make efficient contracts); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the
Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990) (challenging Ayres and Gertner's
conclusions); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV.
821 (1992) (arguing that the default rules of the U.C.C. are actually consented to by the parties because these
rules are tacitly assumed); Jules L. Coleman et al., A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and
Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 639 (1989) (arguing that default rules should
not be used to rectify perceived injustices because the parties can contract around the default rules).
27. See generally Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540 (1902); Robert E. Scott, A
Relational Theory of Default Rules For Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597 (1990); Ian Ayres &
Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and The Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729
(1992); Ayres & Gertner, supra note 26.
28. See Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 489, 508 (1989) (arguing that philosophical theories of promising cannot guide the legal system in
deciding which default rules to adopt; instead, courts should protect the promisee's efficient level of reliance in
the promise); Chamy, supra note 18, at 1859 (arguing that courts should "try to distinguish between customs
that are efficient to use as nonlegal customs, i.e. standard social practices, as contrasted to customs that should
be enforced as well as legal or contractual matter"). Both the liquidated damages discussions and those
involving default rules rely on the theory of transaction costs to justify their positions. Bargaining is not
costless, and very lengthy contracts cannot be waded through, let alone understood, by the principals who must
perform them. For work by the pioneers of transactions costs literature, see OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985); Ronald
H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
29. POSNER, supra note 6, at 107, 118; MacNeil, Efficient Breach, supra note 6, at 963; Friedmann, supra
note 7, at 5.
30. Richard A. Epstein, Inducement of Breach of Contract as a Part of Ostensible Ownership, 16 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 36 (1987); Friedmann, supra note 7, at 2; see COOTER & ULEN, supra note 18, at 289
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caused two harms that were not taken into account by the first scholars to consider it. The
first harm was the promisee's additional insecurity under the original contract, especially
if the promisee had to sue for the breach. 3 1 Second, there was a general loss for the
contracting public. Each of us, when making contracts, might be less secure that our
contracting partner will live up to the terms. 32 We would also feel a moral loss because
people would not be performing their agreements.
33
Nonetheless, while economists generally favor contractual performance, which is
certainly less costly than a system in which people could not enforce contracts, 3 4 there
are some contracts we would be better off without. These are contracts that, if performed,
would create economic waste. 35 Everyone has probably had experience with "monuments
(illustrating a windfall for breach); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 300-01 (1991), quoted
in Friedmann, supra note 7, at 1-2.
31. See Katz, supra note 3, at 546 (explaining that the reason that Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining
Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962) is widely cited and taught is because it is not always clear whether a promisee's
expectation is restricted to his own gains from performance or whether he has an interest in holding the
promisor to what she promised).
32. Friedmann, supra note 7, at 7-8; Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J.
271, 291 (1979) (arguing that money damages are often under-compensatory and that routine availability of
specific performance would not result in exploitations of promises by promisees).
33. Friedmann, supra note 7, at 4, 6. Contrast this with the findings of Stewart Macaulay in the 1960s that
Wisconsin corporate officers operated on a handshake business and almost never resorted to lawsuits or the
threat of them because to do so would be to suggest dishonor on the other's part. Stewart Macaulay, Non-
Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963); see also ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 135 (1991) (suggesting in community
contract disputes between farmers and ranchers in California, norms and self-help, rather than legal rules, tend
to settle disputes); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code 's Search for
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1771 (1996) (stating extralegal as well as legal ties guide
merchants in a number of industries including grains and cotton textiles); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the
Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 115-16
(1972) (arguing in a religious community that deals in diamond cutting and exchange, nonlegal sanctions will
prove more effective than legal ones).
34. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS (1971) ("[T]he privileged and intermediate groups triumph over the numerically superior forces in the
latent or large groups because the former are generally organized and active whereas the latter are normally
unorganized and inactive."); John Umbeck, A Theory of Contract Choice and the California Gold Rush, 20 J.L.
& ECON. 421 (1978) (describing how gold miners protected their gold mines by collective arrangement
whereby, at first, each member of the group agreed to defend the entire territory claimed by the group and, later,
by land allotment whereby each member was allotted a specified subparcel within the territory); Anthony T.
Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 5, 9 (1985) (contemplating civic
friendships arising out of a state of nature in which parties "develop sympathy, affection, or love for one
another"); see also Robert D. Cooter, Organization as Property: Economic Analysis of Property Law, J. OF
LEGAL ECON., Dec. 1992, at 89-90 (discussing the possibility of antitrust violations in allowing restrictive
contracts in markets of less than four competitors).
35. For a general property rights discussion see, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, Ill HARV. L. REV. 621, 626 (1998).
When markets fail to rearrange initial endowments, resources can become stuck in low-value uses
at either end of the property rights spectrum. Whether this misallocation takes the form of overuse
in a commons or underuse in an anticommons, the economic waste of scarce resources results.
Privatizing a commons and bundling an anticommons can solve the tragedies of misuse by better
aligning individual incentives with social welfare.
Id.; see also Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 200-01
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to stupidity," many of them public works projects. 36 Others involve private arrangements
that would cost more than their added value (as in the land restoration projects in the
Wunder37 and Peevyhouse3 8 cases). Economists are loath to second-guess individual
intelligence or taste.39 And lawyers should recognize that some futile (but not unethical)
suits are brought because there is no way to exit a partnership, marriage, or other
situation gracefully 4° or because the client wants to cost the opponent money.4 1 In these
situations, if the contracts are lawful to begin with and there is a breach, economists
would suggest giving the nonbreaching party damages or a choice of contract
performance. 4 2 In other words, the law and economics tradition suggests paternalism is
probably not appropriate. 4 3  (However, few economists would support specific
(1968) (describing the private measures taken to protect against crime, and hypothesizing that fines for criminal
behavior would decrease this expenditure); Charles K. Rowley, Rent-Seeking Versus Directly Unproductive
Profit-Seeking Activities, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RENT SEEKING 15, 22 (Charles K. Rowley et al. eds.,
1988) (proposing that rent-seeking activities may increase the utility of the individual while decreasing wealth
or social good). For a case example, see Schneberger v. Apache Corp., 890 P.2d 847 (Okla. 1995) (selecting
diminution in market value as the remedy because cost of completion damage remedy would lead to economic
waste). For contracts-related explanations, see, e.g., Judith L. Maute, Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining
Co. Revisited.- The Ballad of Willie and Lucille, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1341 (1995); Bailey H. Kuklin, The
Justification for Protecting Reasonable Expectations, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 863, 879-80 (2001).
For a utilitarian, who, as a teleologist, subordinates any independent requirements of justice to the
promotion of preferred consequences or utility, the protection of expectations is often the linchpin
of the law. From a utilitarian viewpoint, the protection of expectations, reasonable or not, follows
from the emotions they arouse and the reliance they induce. A basic fact of human nature is that
the dashing of expectations is painful, arguably more so if the expectations are reasonable. When
dashed expectations have induced reliance, the pain is probably accompanied by economic waste.
This is not good. On the positive side, it is beneficial for society to protect expectations. This
encourages people to invest in the future and thereby increase overall social utility.
Id.; see also Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M'Intosh and the Expropriation of American
Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1065, 1104 (2000) (describing how the expropriation of Indian land was
"efficient").
36. One of our ongoing family jokes was a multimillion-dollar highway interchange in Milwaukee, one
loop of which just ended, suspended in mid-air over the lake. There is also an interstate road in West Virginia
that does not go between (or service) any major cities.
37. Groves v. John Wunder Co., 286 N.W. 235 (Minn. 1939).
38. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962).
39. See GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 3-14 (1976) (stating that you
cannot compare two people's "utility functions").
40. See Saul Levmore, Unconditional Relationships, 76 B.U. L. REV. 807, 825 (1996) (explaining "the
relevance of marriage to the communitarian perspective on the suitability of bargains" by looking at
unenforceable marriage contracts); Saul Levmore, Love It or Leave It: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Exclusivity of Remedies in Partnership and Marriage, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221 (1995) (comparing the
"love-it-or-leave-it" rule of marriage dissolution to partnership law).
41. Richard L. Doemberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing Durability of
Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913 (1987) (arguing that tax legislation is a contract and can be used by a
legislator to hurt private interests).
42. Timothy J. Muris, Cost of Completion or Diminution in Market Value: The Relevance of Subjective
Value, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (1983); Edward Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for Breach of Contract,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (1982).
43. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Great Image of Authority, 36 STAN. L. REV. 349, 351 (1984) (arguing
all court decisions are value-laden, and the construction of rules masks the subjective values of the court);
Anthony Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983) (presenting paternalism as
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performance of a wasteful contract.)44
Law and economics scholars recognize that while there are gains when two or more
people work together on some activity (such as gains from specialization 45 and
economies of scale46), joint production also generates additional costs that must be
considered when making contracts. 47 These costs, which economists dub moral hazard
4 8
or agency costs,49 stem from problems in measuring individual contributions (as opposed
to end products). 50 Shirking (the less fancy name for behavior occasioned by moral
hazard) is encountered in torts51 as well as in contracts. Law students may have
justified by economic efficiency and distributive fairness, personal integrity, and notion of good judgment).
44. See Schwartz, supra note 32, at 277 (arguing that the decision between specific performance of a
contract and damages should be made by the injured party, as he is in the best position to make an efficient
judgment); Friedmann, supra note 7, at 9 (suggesting that contract rules generally do not allow a party to
perform if the performance would be wasteful) (internal citations omitted).
45. Adam Smith first coined this phrase in writing about trade between nations. See ADAM SMITH, AN
INQUIRY INO THE NATURE AND CAUSES INTO THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 25-30 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner
eds., Liberty Classics 1981) (1776). For applications to corporate law, see Armen A. Alchian & Harold
Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); R.H.
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 389 (1937) (analyzing why a firm would want to emerge in
a specialized exchange economy). See generally OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES:
ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975) (explaining how the choice of business form drives the
efficiency of that business); George Stigler, The Division of Labor is Limited by the Extent of the Market, 59 J.
POL. ECON. 185 (1951) (proposing that Adam Smith's theorem on division of labor is the core of a theory of the
functions of firms and industry); HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996) (explaining the
difference between ownership forms). For applications to family law, see GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON
THE FAMILY 277-78 (2d ed. 1991); William J. Goode, Comment: The Economics of Nonmonetary Variables, in
ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 345 (Theodore S. Schultz ed., 1974); POSNER, supra note 6, 140. The predictions
of the efficient specialization model include a fault system to protect against shirking. See Gary S. BECKER, A
TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 49 (2d ed. 1991) (allowing alimony to protect the wife's human capital investment in
marriage); Elisabeth M. Landes, Economics ofAlimony, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 46 (1978) (recognizing the husband
makes important decisions for the couple); Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Women's Rights Claims
Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994) (discussing the presumptions in
favor of the wife in child custody actions); VICTOR FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 42-74
(1988).
46. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 21-
41 (1990) (examining the beginnings and growth of managerial capitalism in the United States, Great Britain,
and Germany).
47. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 45, at 779 (describing the concept of "team production");
WILLIAM A. KLEIN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES (1980)
(elucidating the interrelationship of economic elements and legal principles in the fields of business
organization and finance); see also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Team Production in Business
Organizations: An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 743, 745 (1999) (describing the problems involved in team
production); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV.
247, 253 (1999) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, Team Production Theory] (noting agency costs associated with team
production). For applications to family law, see MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT 49-57
(2000).
48. POSNER, supra note 6, at 108; Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65
MINN. L. REV. 521 (1981).
49. Blair & Stout, Team Production Theory, supra note 47, at 48.
50. ARMEN A. ALCHIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: COMPETITION,
COORDINATION, AND CONTROL 50-54 (2d ed. 1977) (discussing basic principles of supply and demand and
their effects on price setting).
51. That is, if there is not "industry liability" with proportionate responsibility fixed by a share of the
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experienced it personally in study groups or other joint school projects. Some student will
find it easier to gain from others while not contributing as much as the others in the
group. Contracts can eliminate some of these problems by, in effect, providing for
"payment by the piece," 52 or for each unit produced. (In the study group, it might be
payment for each page of outline contributed or for each section outlined that meets
group standards). When this is not possible, contract partners may provide for some kind
of performance monitoring.53 Unequal contribution problems surface in damages
questions as well. For example, payment "up-front" may encourage the party already paid
to shirk at the end of a contract. 54 Liquidated damages that do not reflect quality, speed,
or effort may create disincentives for optimal performance (from an objective
perspective) and, therefore, warrant claims that they are "penalties." 55 Again, these
problems relate to economists' desire to encourage performance of efficient contracts.
As one may have noticed from the preceding paragraphs, while economists
generally support contractual efficiency, they do not entirely agree about what it means.
For many, if not most, commercial contracts, the parties make agreements with each
party having the simple goal of maximizing financial profits (usually by minimizing
costs56 or taking fewer risks).5 7 Nevertheless, many contracts do not fit this model,
market or something similar. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980) (holding that if
plaintiff could prove that defendants manufactured a substantial percentage of the drug on the market, liability
should be apportioned in the proportion represented by the plaintiff's market share).
52. Steven Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-3 (1983).
53. Id. at 8 (discussing the agents Chinese boatmen hired to whip workers who shirked); see also Michael
C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-10 (1976) (explaining that when the interests of the agent are not
compatible with the interests of the principal, costs incurred by both arise due to divergence of their interests);
Thomas S. Ulen, The Coasean Firm in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 311-12 (1993) (explaining that
monitoring team member productivity is efficient only to the extent that the increment to productive efficiency
of team production exceeds the increased monitoring costs).
54. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 129, 97-98 (discussing the holdout problem). For an example of how this
might work, see Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1290 (7th Cir. 1985). The case sets
forth the following proposition:
Suppose to begin with that the breach occurs the day after Lake River buys its new bagging system
for $89,000 and before Carborundum ships any Ferro Carbo. Carborundum would owe Lake River
$533,000. Since Lake River would have incurred at that point a total cost of only $89,000 its net
gain from the breach would be $444,000. This is more than four times the profit of $107,000 (20
percent of the contract price of $533,000) that Lake River expected to make from the contract if it
had been performed: a huge windfall.
Id.
55. POSNER, supra note 6, at 128-30; Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Towards a General Theory
of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 1000 (1983).
56. Economists draw distinctions between economic profits (higher than market rate of return) and
accounting profits (revenues greater than costs). While all firms operating "in the black" have accounting
profits, without market power (such as a patent or monopoly), it is impossible for the firm to obtain economic
profits. Firms achieve accounting profits by devising more efficient means of production (since in theory they
cannot control the price at which they will purchase inputs such as labor, machinery, or materials). But almost
immediately the firms will lose their advantage, since their superior methods and any attempt to undercut
market prices will be copied by all their competitors. Katz, supra note 3, at 551-52.
57. See, e.g., Dwight M. Jaffe & Thomas Russell, Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit
Rationing, 90 Q.J. ECON. 651, 652 (1976) (explaining why banks do not just raise interest rates for bad credit
risks); Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 AM.
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making damage calculations more difficult. For example, contracts can involve heirlooms
that are priceless only to an individual family. 58 They can also involve payment for one
party's bearing a child for another. 59 Contracts can feature education that creates only
intellectual wealth (for example, a Ph.D. in medieval philosophy60 or in the language of
an extinct people) 6 1 or only religious wealth (as in Talmudic studies). 62 Most law and
economics scholars would support a person's ability to contract about such transactions
(surrogacy perhaps excepted). 63 Damages for contract breach cause difficult valuation
problems. In the heirloom case, specific performance may replace damages if a party to
the contract was a member of the family concerned. 64 Though a single child is unique,
many scholars (law and economics adherents among them) will support damage awards,
but not specific performance, for breach of a surrogacy contract. 65 Children are not
ECON. REV. 393, 408 (1981) (same); see also Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract and Property: The Model
of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1985) (discussing how the ability to externalize risks causes inefficiency).
An example of this goal can be seen in the following quotation:
Maximizing profit is really just taking the amount of potential return and weighing it by the
potential outcome, i.e., the risk. What we are trying to do is discern ways to develop a wider base,
either by using bigger platform technology that can be spread across a number of different product
opportunities, or by having the ability to develop five drugs in parallel instead of one. This is the
goal of minimizing risk, and spreading it over many pieces. Risk always has to be gauged by how
much money you have in the bank.
Symposium, Financing the Biotech Industry: Can the Risks be Reduced?, 4 B.U. J. SCi. & TECH. L. 1, 61
(1998).
58. See generally 2 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, HAWKLAND UCC SERIES § 2-716 (2001) (describing the
limitation for buyer's remedy to unique goods); cf In re Estate of McDowell, 345 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1973)
(discussing a testator who willed his estate to his children to be divided equally. The children went to court over
his rocking chair, over which each eventually got "custody" for half the year, with the survivor taking the chair
in "fee."); see generally Wendy C. Lowengrub, Unique or Ubiquitous: Art Prints and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 72 IND. L.J. 595 (1997); cf Sedmak v. Charlie's Chevrolet, Inc., 622 S.W.2d 694 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)
(refusing to grant recovery of specific performance for a 1962 Corvette when a like model could be obtained
elsewhere).
59. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 784 (Cal. 1993) (upholding surrogacy contract as valid).
60. See CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN INVITATION TO FAMILY LAW: PRINCIPLES,
PROCESS, AND POSSIBILITIES 363 (2d ed. 2000) (providing the Joe and Sheila example).
61. See Srinivasan v. Srinivasan, 396 S.E.2d 675, 678 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) (noting wife received education
in Sanskrit "more for self-fulfillment than for the future financial support of the family").
62. See Goldberger v. Goldberger, 624 A.2d 1328, 1333 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) ("Appellant testified
that he studies 'for the sake of studying .... '").
63. Margaret Friedlander Brinig, A Maternalistic Approach to Surrogacy: Comment on Richard Epstein's
Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2377, 2377 (1995) (using family law
arguments to oppose specifically enforceable surrogacy contracts); Michael J. Trebilcock & Rosemin Keshvani,
The Role of Private Ordering in Family Law: A Law and Economics Perspective, 41 U. TORONTO L.J. 533, 572
(1992) (presenting the advantages of surrogacy contracts).
64. If neither party was a member of the affected family, the transaction would be treated as though there
was nothing special about the goods involved. Anthony Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV.
351 (1978).
65. See Brinig, supra note 63, at 2397-98 (rejecting a movement toward specifically enforcing contracts
for surrogacy); Trebilcock & Keshvani, supra note 63, at 585 (allowing cooling-off post breach); Ronald A.
Cass, Coping with Life, Law, and Markets: A Comment on Posner and the Law-and-Economics Debate, 67 B.U.
L. REV. 73 (1987). But see Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA.
L. REV. 2305 (1995) (arguing for specifically enforceable surrogacy contracts).
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measurable in monetary terms.66 Both the children and the gestation needed for their
survival are so closely related to emotions and the pregnant mother's self-definition that
even if we were not worried about shirking, 67 we might be concerned about treating
children as commodities. 68 With the expensive but non-income-producing degree or the
perpetual scholar, law and economics scholars will want to equate the value of the
education to the price paid in order to avoid having to estimate either how much value the
education was going to produce (the usual expectation measure), how much it was really
worth to the individual (a completely subjective measure), or how much was given up to
acquire it in terms of another career (opportunity cost).
69
Assume that both parties agree that a valid contract has been made and both parties
understand what performance is required. What does the contract mean? Law and
economics scholars disagree whether in this case, and assuming no intervening event or
state of facts, parties have a right to choose whether to perform or pay damages. 70 Some
scholars argue each party has a right to efficiently breach, that is, to pay the other party
the expectation value of the contract, particularly if a better deal has come along.
71
Others (perhaps the majority) write instead that because we need a functional system of
contracts, people should not be quite so free to breach. 72 That is, each party to a valid
contract has a duty to perform that goes beyond the pure compensation principle.
Looking at the problem from the perspective of the nonbreaching party may allow one to
see that there is not only an inconvenience, but also an almost immoral quality associated
with contract breach. Some evidence suggests, for example, that adherents of religions
emphasizing guilt and obligation are less likely to declare bankruptcy and more likely to
perform contracts. 73 Stewart Macaulay's famous study noted that to threaten a lawsuit
would breach the commercial norm of following "gentlemen's agreements" and trusting
66. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 850
(1994) (discussing problems with a free-market system for babies or discrimination); Joan Mahoney, An Essay
on Surrogacy and Feminist Thought, 16 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 81, 82 (1988) (analyzing issues raised by
surrogacy and some answers feminist jurisprudence might suggest to deal with them); Margaret Jane Radin,
Market Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1853 (1987) (explaining the differences between inalienability
as being nongiveable, nonsalable, or completely nontransferable); Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and
Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56, 69-83 (1993) (discussing ways in which money damages for pain and
suffering and loss of consortium can commodify the human experience).
67. For a discussion of shirking in this context, see Alan Schwartz, supra note 32, at 277.
68. Radin, supra note 66, at 1852, 1856; Gillian K. Hadfield, The Dilemma of Choice: A Feminist
Perspective on the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 337 (1995).
69. See Allen M. Parkman, Human Capital as Property in Celebrity Divorces, 29 FAM. L.Q. 141 (1995).
70. See OLIVER W. HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 300-01 (1881) (arguing that a contracting party is
not subject to servitude); DOUGLAS G. LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 7
(3d ed. 1990) (explaining the difference between legal and equitable remedies); POSNER, supra note 6, at 120-
21 (discussing how a damages award may not result in the best economic result).
71. POSNER, supra note 6, at 107; Yorio, supra note 42, at 1423-24 (arguing for modifying current
damages rules to include more flexibility).
72. See Friedmann, supra note 7, at 2 (describing an entitlement to performance), 13 (stating the
nonbreaching party should be able to recover more than expectation damages so as to get the benefit of the
third-party interest); see also Epstein, supra note 30, at 40 (recognizing parties can negotiate beforehand or
renegotiate for the possibility of breach).
73. See F.H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, The Bankruptcy Puzzle, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 200, 201
(1998) (arguing that changes in social norms, rather than legal changes, explain the tripling of bankruptcy filing
rates from 1984 to 1991).
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one's trading partners.
74
On a less lofty scale, we know that many outside forces affect contract performance.
The most common of these (and therefore the most frequently allocated by contracts) is a
change in market prices. 7 5 Such a change might include the price of a substitute, 76 or
complementary goods, 77 or of something used to make the goods, called a factor of
production. 78 Less often, there may be a change in technology (such as the invention of
the Xerox process when your business was ditto paper) 79 or the intervention of an "act of
God" that may render performance very costly, wasteful, or impossible. 80 If outside
forces drastically change the ability to perform, one party may therefore seek to excuse
performance. Sometimes the literature suggests that we look at what reasonable parties
would most likely have intended in such a circumstance had they thought about it in
advance. 81 Sometimes, as with the matters involved in the first goal of encouraging
contract formation, the argument will be that the contract should be discharged (neither
required to further perform) because performance would occasion economic waste. 8 2 (In
other words, neither party could have foreseen nor insured against what occurred and to
require performance would just be silly).
8 3
74. Macaulay, supra note 33; Simon Johnson et al., Courts and Relational Contracts, 18 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 221, 222 (2002).
75. See, e.g., Mo. Furnace Co. v. Cochran, 8 F. 463 (W.D. Pa. 1881) (adjudicating case involving change
in market price for Coke); Baird, supra note 20, at 49 (providing commentary on the Missouri Furnace case);
Chicago Coliseum Club v. Dempsey, 265 I1. App. 542 (1932) (discussing change in market price for fight
when the fighters involved changed); TREBILCOCK, supra note 21, at 139-40 (discussing Chicago Coliseum
Club).
76. See Lillian R. BeVier, Reconsidering Inducement, 76 VA. L. REv. 877, 898 (1990) (stating that when
substitutes exist, contract damages seem reasonably capable, upon the promisor's breach, to make the promisee
indifferent between performance and breach).
77. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 570-75 (1967) (documenting that though Procter &
Gamble was not in the market for liquid bleach, it produced complementary goods and acquired Clorox as an
alternative to entering the market independently); see also Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407
(2d Cir. 1917) (pancake flour and syrup); Valmor Prods. Co. v. Standard Prods. Corp., 464 F.2d 200 (1st Cir.
1972) (hair care preparation and hair dryer); Jetzon Tire & Rubber Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 177 U.S.P.Q.
467 (T.T.A.B. 1973) (tires and automobiles). For definitions and general discussions, see, e.g., Roger D. Blair
& Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 85-89 (2001); Carmen Matutes
& Pierre Regibeau, Compatibility and Bundling of Complementary Goods in a Duopoly, 50 J. INDUS. ECON. 37,
46 (1992); Lester Telser, A Theory of Monopoly of Complementary Goods, 52 J. BUS. 211, 211-30 (1979).
78. Baird, supra note 20, at 54-55.
79. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing in the
United States, 111 Q.J. ECON. 277, 279 (1996) (reasoning that technological changes shift available choices,
creating winners and losers).
80. See, e.g., Taylor v. Caldwell, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (Q.B. 1863) (explaining the doctrine of contract
impossibility); Krell v. Henry, 2 K.B. 740 (C.A. 1903) (explaining the doctrine of contract frustration of
purpose).
81. POSNER, supra note 6, at 102-09 (discussing the doctrine of impossibility and related doctrines in the
insurance contract context).
82. Muris, supra note 42, at 391 (discussing situations that can lead to economic waste); Yorio, supra note
42, at 1424 (providing an argument for discharge in an economic waste case).
83. Of course, we may want to leave parties where they were under the contract in order to encourage
performance of contracts generally.
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D. Goal Four. Damages Should Reflect the Other Goals of Contract
Both common law and the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) limit consequential
damages to what the breaching party could reasonably have foreseen. 84 There are several
law and economics explanations for this limitation. First, consequential damages that are
not foreseeable from the contract itself or carefully pointed out to the other party are
usually better known by the nonbreaching party. 85 This, in turn, means several things.
First, such consequential harms may be controlled by the nonbreaching party. In tort,
when the breaching party has done a "legal wrong," it makes some sense to put the risk of
the "eggshell skull" on the wrongdoer. 86 In contract, we might expect the nonbreaching
party either to avoid the loss altogether (by purchasing an additional mine shaft in Hadley
v. Baxendale87) or to purchase insurance that will cover the risk.88 For example, if having
a car available at all times is really important to a driver, the driver can purchase
insurance that will cover a rental car if the driver's car must have body work done
because of an accident, even one that was his fault. If there are important damages that
are hidden and cannot be insured against, the legal rule in contract encourages the party
who would suffer the damages to disclose them and make them part of the contract.
89
A related concern is that if consequential damages could be completely recovered in
cases in which the other party breached, there would be less pressure to adhere to the
contract in the first place.90 (This is related to the problem of shirking discussed earlier.)
In these cases, the nonbreaching party might also be tempted to exaggerate damage
84. Cooter, supra note 57, at 11-16; Goetz & Scott, supra note 16, at 1280 n.42.
85. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. Ct. 1854); see also U.C.C. § 2-715(2).
Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include (a) any loss resulting from
general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had
reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and (b) injury
to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty.
Id.; Gwen D. Quillen, Contract Damages and Cross-Subsidization, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1128 (1988);
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 26, at 101; see also Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 15, at 286 (discussing transfer
of information).
86. Cf Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929). Hawkins was a case wherein a surgeon promised
Hawkins that an operation would leave him with a "one hundred percent good hand." Id.. However, following
the surgery, Hawkins suffered ill effects from the operation, sued, and ultimately recovered as damages the
difference between the value of a perfect hand and the value of the post-operative hand. Id.
87. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854); see POSNER, supra note 6, at 126-27 (discussing consequential damages in
the case of contract breach); Richard Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of
Contract, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1989) (arguing for the use of a plain meaning approach to contract
interpretation in assessing damages); J.P. Kostritsky, "Why Infer"? What The New Institutional Economics Has
To Say About Law-Supplied Default Rules, 73 TUL. L. REV. 497, 523-24 (1998) (discussing the "Hadley Rule"
and possible alternatives); Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 15, at 285-86 (finding limitations because of
foreseeability rule).
88. See, e.g., Cretex Companies, Inc. v. Constr. Leaders, Inc., 342 N.W.2d 135 (Minn. 1984) (explaining
the theory of intended third party beneficiaries in the context of a bond payment by a surety).
89. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 126-27 (analogizing this type of situation to the tort situation where
disallowance of recovery occurs when a person injured could have, but did not, avoid the injury by wearing a
seatbelt).
90. See, e.g., J.O. Hooker & Sons v. Roberts Cabinet Co., 683 So. 2d 396 (Miss. 1996) (awarding
expectation damages for breach of contract for cabinets in public housing project, which included a 26% profit
and the salary of managers who worked on the breached contract and were therefore kept from other business);
Bebchuk & Shavell, supra note 15, at 285-86; Epstein, supra note 87, at 116-18.
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claims to include items that were not strictly related to the contract or were otherwise
somewhat fanciful. 9 1
In general, if damages are hard to predict, the expectation formula will present
problems. 92 Sometimes the damages will prove so intractable that only nominal damages
will be awarded. 93 Sometimes the parties will specify damages in the contract, risking a
later finding that the damages were a penalty. Sometimes, though, there will not be
enough assets at the time of contracting to credibly bankroll liquidated damages.
Sometimes, courts will abandon expectation notions in favor of some other remedy that
does not leave the party in as difficult a valuation position. A common contemporary
example involves a couple dissolving their marriage who have been married for a
relatively short period of time and have not accumulated many traditional assets.
However, one of them (often the complaining party in the divorce action) has acquired an
advanced degree over the course of the marriage. The other has worked throughout,
paying household expenses and contributing to tuition costs. The working spouse claims
an expectation in a higher standard of living94 or that after launching the other's career,
the student spouse would fund further education for the working spouse. 95
However, most divorce courts do not treat the student's advanced degree as a
species of property that can be divided 96 but turn instead to some type of contractual
analysis. The first question involves how one might compute the nonstudent's
expectation damages. Expert testimony could be used to establish the average difference
between a person's lifetime earnings with and without the advanced degree.97 Although
91. See Epstein, supra note 87, at 114-18 (explaining the weakness of the expectation damage remedy).
92. Katz, supra note 3, at 554 (explaining the "liquidated specific performance" formula for damages).
93. See Quillen, supra note 85, at 1136-37 (finding that courts are concerned with proportionality in
contracts).
94. See DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Minn. 1981) (finding that although a working
spouse had an expectation of a higher standard of living, the trial court award including only reimbursement for
financial support she provided to the student spouse was not an abuse of discretion).
95. See McSparron v. McSparron, 662 N.E.2d 745, 750-51 (N.Y. 1995) (finding that the degree earned by
the student spouse was an item of marital property subject to equitable distribution); Margaret F. Brinig & June
Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divorce, 62 TUL. L. REV. 863, 878-79, 898, 900 (1988)
(stating this despite the working spouse's lost career opportunities and the expectations of additional benefits
for the children or an enhanced family life).
96. New York goes the furthest in making professional degrees marital property. See, e.g., O'Brien v.
O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that a husband's medical license was marital property). New
York also equitably distributes other career gains that occurred as a result of the marriage. See, e.g., Golub v.
Golub, 527 N.Y.S.2d 946 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (holding that the increase in value of a wife's acting and
modeling career was marital property).
97. At least one court has provided a mathematical approach to valuing the contribution one spouse makes
to the other spouse's acquisition of a degree that seems to avoid the problems of "averaging" while nonetheless
considering the worth of the degree. The idea in In re Marriage of Francis, 442 N.W.2d 59 (Iowa 1989), is that
an investment in a professional degree, like any other asset that earns money, comes from two sources: labor
and capital. Id. at 65. Contributions to labor come entirely from the spouse in school and constitute the bulk of
what the degree (or other income-earning asset) will produce. Id. Contributions to capital, on the other hand,
can come from either, or both, spouses. Id. at 64-65. These may be in cash or in kind, through earnings in the
labor force or relieving the student spouse of household or parenting responsibilities. Id. Although there may be
tremendous variations in the return to the contributions to labor, the returns to capital are thought to be quite
predictable and easy to measure. Francis, 442 N.W.2d at 61. For instance, these returns are used by financial
institutions to establish the interest rates for lending money. The expert witness who testified in Francis
established that the conventional ratio of labor to capital for financial investments is 70/30. Id. at 65. Using this
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such testimony often supports worker's compensation or wrongful death awards, both of
these actions involve a tort concept of fault. In tort, if there is some chance that the
person might not have actually earned as much as suggested by the expert, the fact of the
legal wrongdoing justifies placing the risk on the tortfeasor.9 8 That analysis cannot easily
be carried over to the divorce case in which fault need not be proved (and may be
irrelevant) in making awards. 99 In contract law, the student spouse may justly claim that
he or she wanted a career in public service or academia where the monetary rewards were
far less than the average professional salary. 100 The student may even claim that his or
her spouse had no justifiable expectation of a higher standard of living or "payback"
because a marriage resembles a contract terminable at will.
Divorce courts more commonly turn to other damage measures. Instead of trying to
place the working spouse in the position he or she would have held had the contract been
performed, courts look instead to what would have happened if the education contract
had not been made-the reliance measure. Divorce courts might look to what other
sources of funding the student spouse could have used (e.g., loans from banks or parents)
or to the money the student would have earned during the marriage had the degree not
theory, the Mahoney court would have calculated the nonstudent spouse's contribution to capital at
approximately $24,000/($24,000 + $6500), or 80%. Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1982). This 80%
would then be multiplied by 30% (the proportion of the value of the degree attributable to labor) and the result
(.24) multiplied by the value of the average business degree. Presumably an award under this system would be
higher than the $5000 awarded by the trial court. Id. at 534-35. It would be higher because the Francis-type
measure would be an expectation, or gains-based, measure rather than a sacrifice, or loss-based, one.
98. See June Carbone, The Futility of Coherence, The ALI's Principles of the Law, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUD.
43, 75 (2002) (explaining that a husband will be expected to financially support his wife and children even
though his wife, not him, filed for a no-fault divorce); Michael Dorff, Attaching Tort Claims to Contract
Actions: An Economic Analysis of Contort, 28 SETON HALL L. REv. 390, 426 (1997) (arguing that tortfeasors
should be held liable for misrepresentation or concealment).
99. Brinig & Carbone, supra note 95, at 867 (arguing that the expectation and reliance explanations for
alimony analogized from damage measures in breach of contract have no place in no-fault divorce, which does
not require, or in some states admit, breach of marital obligation for dissolution of the marriage).
100. See Gelletly v. Gelletly, No. 1127-95-2, 1996 Va. App. LEXIS 39, at *2 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 1996)
(holding that a husband's change in career from a high-paying job to a low-paying job did not excuse the
payment of spousal support); Stubblebine v. Stubblebine, No. 1915-94-4, 1996 Va. App. LEXIS 98, at *2 (Va.
Ct. App. Feb. 13, 1996) (holding that because the husband was capable of gainful employment, he must be
imputed income based on his most recent job). For a discussion of this problem, see DeWitt v. DeWitt, 296
N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980), in which the court stated:
We think they [approaches for valuing a professional degree] share the disadvantage of being
wholly speculative. Whether a professional education is and will be of future value to its recipient
is a matter resting on factors which are at best difficult to anticipate or measure. A person qualified
by education for a given profession may choose not to practice it, may fail at it, or may practice in a
specialty, location or manner which generates less than the average income enjoyed by fellow
professionals. The potential worth of the education may never be realized for these or many other
reasons. An award based upon the prediction of the degree holder's success at the chosen field may
bear no relationship to the reality he or she faces after the divorce. Unlike an award of alimony,
which can be adjusted after divorce to reflect unanticipated changes in the parties' circumstances, a
property division may not. The potential for inequity to the failed professional or one who changes
careers is at once apparent; his or her spouse will have been awarded a share of something which
never existed in any real sense.
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been pursued.' 0 ' If the choice in a particular marriage involved a deferred degree for the
student spouse, the court could look at the opportunity cost of the delayed degree (i.e., the
future earnings lost by the working spouse). This last opportunity cost measure, of
course, involves considerable more speculation than the court is likely to want to
make. 102
The divorce court's typical calculation involves totaling up the money contributed
by each spouse during the education period to the degree-obtaining effort and
reimbursing the working spouse for his or her contribution. 10 3 This might be seen as a
reliance measure or as restitution (disgorging the benefit that would not otherwise be
obtained by the student spouse). 10 4 The award typically includes direct costs paid by the
working spouse to tuition and books and half of the household expenses (support) paid by
the working spouse during the time the student spouse was in school (assuming the
student spouse was not also working). 10 5 Courts usually make these awards as some type
of alimony (reimbursement alimony is one term used), thus avoiding contract
terminology but not contract reasoning.10 6
1. Asymmetric Contracts
For example, assume the following stylized facts:
The Buyer, Basalt Mining Company, and the Seller, Spur Railroad, entered into a
five-year contract with an option to renew. Under the contract, Spur was to construct and
operate a railroad line to Basalt's new mine. The coal from Basalt's mine would be
loaded on Spur's railroad cars and shipped to Port City. A geological survey done by
Basalt's engineers estimated that the coal seam in the new mine would last at least ten
years. Basalt and Spur both estimated that an average of at least one railroad car per week
could be loaded from the mine, 52 cars per year, or 260 cars over the life of the contract.
Spur knew at the time of contracting that it would cost $100,000 to build the new
railroad line and another $100 per railroad car to ship the coal. Spur agreed to charge
Basalt $1000 per shipment. Spur calculated (reasonably) that it would net $134,000 on its
101. See In re Marriage of Lundberg, 318 N.W.2d 918, 924 (Wis. 1982) (stating that if instead of
supporting the medical-student husband, the wife had invested her money at a five percent rate of return, she
would have acquired $33,077 by 1980).
102. See PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 5.05, cmt. at 204 (Tentative Draft 1995).
103. See Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 534 (N.J. 1982) (noting that such contributions may include
"household expenses, educational costs, school travel expenses and any other contributions used by the
supported spouse in obtaining his or her degree or license"); Hoak v. Hoak, 370 S.E.2d 473, 478 (W. Va. 1988)
(same).
104. See DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Minn. 1981) ("[Respondent] had reasonable
expectation that she would be rewarded for her efforts by higher standard of living."); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603
P.2d 747, 751-52 (Okla. 1979) (holding a wife divorcing a physician immediately after he finished his residency
was entitled to be compensated for the amount of her investment in his education and training in order to
prevent his unjust enrichment); Carbone, supra note 98, at 56, 68-69 (discussing how lost earning capacity
should be computed upon divorce when, during the marriage, one spouse gave up significant career
opportunities for the other spouse or the couple's children).
105. See Mahoney, 453 A.2d at 534 (holding that reimbursement alimony should include all financial
contributions toward the former spouse's education and living expenses).
106. See DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d at 758 (using "expectation," reliance, and restitution to determine
appropriate damages).
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initial investment. [(260 X $1000 = $260,000) - ($100,000 + 26,000 = $126,000) =
$134,000]. However, the $100,000 it cost to build the line would not be recouped until
early in the third year of the contract ($100,000/900 = 111.11, or the third week of the
third year).
The contract looked a bit different from Basalt's perspective. Basalt would begin to
earn its profit immediately. It charged $2500 per railroad car of coal to the distributor at
Port City. It cost $1000 to ship the coal on Spur's line and another $500 per car to extract
the coal from the mine. Basalt could assume that each carload would net $1000, for a
total expected yield over the first five years of $260,000.
Things did not turn out as expected, however. Basalt cancelled the contract after
shipping only 25 carloads of coal, since the seam was not as rich as expected. Now that
the mine had been dug, engineers knew that only an additional 75 carloads of coal could
be extracted at an additional cost of $2000/carload to Basalt. By the time of cancellation,
the mine had netted $25,000. From Basalt's perspective, if the mine were emptied, it
would lose $12,500 ($25,000 - $37,500). It would be impossible to extract the last 160
carloads of coal from the mine. Basalt could allow Spur to run empty coal cars or just pay
them the net price (net of the $100 cost Spur would have to pay per car) for the unfilled
215 cars.
From Spur's perspective, at the time the contract was cancelled, it had a loss of
$77,500 ($100,000 - (25 X $900)). If Basalt emptied the mine, Spur would still lose
$10,000 ($100,000 - (100 X $900)). What is the correct damage amount?
The contract was, at the time of its making, a fair one. Both parties anticipated they
would be better off undertaking the joint project than without it. It was reasonable for
Spur to invest the $100,000 in building the railroad (so its loss is foreseeable to Basalt). It
would have been logical, had terms been ambiguous, to allocate the risk of coal deposit
failure on Basalt. It hired the geological engineers, and Spur had no reason to know how
much coal was in the seam. However, both parties knew at the outset that Spur could not
make money until some time during the third year. A good argument could be made that
Spur should have written some minimum number of carloads (some number greater than
111) or some minimum payment (some amount over $111,000) into the contract.
In this hypothetical, Basalt has breached while it is still ahead and should not be able
to walk off with the profit from its breach. Possible damage measures are:
(1) Expectation damages. But, should this be measured by the original estimates
($134,000 net, assuming Spur runs 160 empty cars and Basalt pays as planned) or what
would have happened if the contract were performed, with extraction of the coal
remaining in the mine ($10,000 loss to Spur)?
(2) Reliance damages. Spur has made a reasonable outlay of $100,000. This outlay
was not only foreseeable, but was known to Basalt. Should damages be limited by the
expectation measure (so Spur would get back an additional $67,500 from Basalt, ending
up with a $10,000 loss)? Or, should Spur get $100,000 plus the cost of shipping the 25
cars (an additional $2500) with interest (the opportunity cost to Spur of undertaking this
project, assuming it had other customers for whom it could build and operate railroads)?
(3) Restitution damages. Should Spur get the $25,000 Basalt has made on the first
25 cars? In this case, Spur would still lose $75,000. Should Spur get the entire amount
Basalt received from the first 25 cars, or $62,500 ($2500 X 25)? (They would then lose
$15,000 on the contract.)
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2. Some Possible Answers
The appropriate measure of damages depends on the facts of each case, and it also
depends on whether the parties themselves allocated the risk of loss to the nonbreaching
party. 10 7 Specific performance is not appropriate in a losing contract because such
performance is economically wasteful. Even in a profitable contract, the court will not
award specific performance if the investing party can recoup its investment in another
contract. 
108
Expectation damages may be appropriate when the profits can be calculated with
specificity. In a new venture, where profits are speculative, courts are unwilling to award
expectation damages and assume no (zero) profits. 10 9 This may understate the
nonbreaching party's damages, but protects the breaching party from suffering too harsh
a penalty.
Restitution damages, or "off the contract" damages, are appropriate when rescission
is the appropriate remedy.1 10 The court will seek to put the parties back into the status
quo ante the contract was made.111 Restitution would not be appropriate in the
Spur/Basalt action because the contract is not "being unmade." It seems unfair to force
Spur to repay Basalt the revenues Spur made on the contract since Spur has not yet
recouped its investment. Though Basalt intentionally and substantially breached,1 12 the
107. Cf Telecom Int'l Am., Ltd. v. AT&T Corp., 280 F.3d 175, 194-95 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying New
Jersey law and finding large corporate parties to a three-part telecommunications contract had themselves
allocated the risk of various types of outcomes, including the risk that the system would not function); see also
McLish v. Harris Farms, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 1075, 1084 (E.D. Cal. 1980) (involving allocation of risk under a
cattle and cattle feed contract).
108. See, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Potomac Coal Co., 51 Md. 327 (1879) (involving a contract to
provide railroad cars at coal company's expense in exchange for price reduction when Potomac shipped coal on
B & O's railroad lines. This contract remained in effect long enough for both parties to profit, and Potomac's
investments could be used in other contracts.).
109. See, e.g., Autotrol Corp. v. Cont'l Water Sys. Corp., 918 F.2d 689, 694 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.)
(involving a contract that specified application of Texas law and involved design of a control system for a water
purifier upon which Continental owned the patent. Another firm purchased Continental and terminated the
contract over a dispute in how the market would be shared, to the detriment of Autotrol. The court held that
profits were not speculative, but could be calculated in this case, since Autotrol was an established business
involved in many concurrent projects. The court also allowed recovery of variable expenses including salary of
employees who were allocated to the project.); cf Cyberchon v. Calldata, 47 F.3d 39, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1995)
(applying New York law and involving a plaintiff who sought overhead and "shutdown" expenses under a
promissory estoppel claim on a contract involving the creation of software for a defense contractor, when the
plaintiff could establish a "demonstrable past history of ongoing business operations" and shutdown costs
incurred due to reliance upon Calldata promises); In re Paine Webber Ltd. P'ships Litig., 171 F.R.D. 104, 127-
28 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (allowing a pro rata distribution of cash under Texas law paid by broker for losses on
investments falsely represented as safe because the damages resulted from misrepresentation).
110. See, e.g., Earthinfo, Inc. v. Hydrosphere Res. Consultants, Inc., 900 P.2d 113, 115-17, 121 (Colo.
1995) (involving a contract for the production of hydrological and meteorological information on CD-ROM that
was rescinded after Earthinfo, which succeeded the marketer's interest, refused to pay royalties on a derivative
product. Both parties sought rescission of the contract, and profits not attributable to Earthinfo's efforts should
have been returned to Hydrosphere.) (citing E. Alan Famsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the
Disgorgement Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1341 (1985)).
111. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.03(6) (2d ed. 1993) (explaining the meaning of
rescission).
112. See Earthinfo, 900 P.2d at 119 (stating that if the defendant's wrongdoing was intentional or
substantial, recovery of profits may be granted).
2002)
The Journal of Corporation Law
parties did not mutually rescind the contract-Spur wanted the contract to continue so it
could realize a profit. Further, profits depended on efforts made by both the breaching
and nonbreaching parties. 113
Courts award reliance interests when the nonbreaching party cannot hope to recover
its investment on a losing contract because the assets gained by the investment cannot be
applied to another contract (the investment is contract-specific).1 14 The nonbreaching
party has a right to collect variable costs expended in reliance on the contract, but not
fixed costs it would have incurred anyway. 1 15 In the Spur/Basalt agreement, the
investment of $100,000 to build the railway fits the definition of a variable cost, made
only because of the contract, and not capable of recoupment in another contract. Running
the cars, however, might represent overhead (fixed costs) because the cars could be used
for other contracts. Also, these expenses were compensated for by Basalt.
II. WHERE Do CONTRACTS AND FAMILY LAW PART WAYS?
Family law often becomes clearer to students and jurists when explained using
theories from general civil litigation. 1 16 Academics have found contract and corporate
explanations particularly useful. 117 However, these theories have problems, problems
113. See id. at 120 (stating that even if a willful breach, a wrongdoer should not be made to give up that
which is his own); DOBBS, supra note 111, § 4.1(4) (explaining the measurement of restitution). These included
mining the coal and paying Spur to ship the coal for $1500. Since each shipment cost Spur $100 per railroad car
plus $384.62/week (the initial cost of building the line divided by the number of weeks in the contract), Basalt
contributed a little more than 75% of the costs.
114. See Interstate Indus. Unif Rental Serv., Inc. v. Couri Pontiac, 355 A.2d 913, 916-17, 922 (Me. 1976)
(involving a contract with a liquidated damages clause and a seller who incurred costs of more than $2000
manufacturing and tailoring uniforms. Couri, the buyer, discovered that it had a duplicate agreement with
another service and cancelled its contract with IJURS. IIURS successfully sued to enforce the liquidated
damages clause for the uniforms for the balance of the contract ($3000), which was reasonably related to the
loss sustained by the breach.).
115. Autotrol Corp. v. Cont'l Water Sys. Corp., 918 F.2d 689, 692 (7th Cir. 1990). In Autotrol, $245,000
was a contract-specific variable cost. Id. at 692. Autotrol would not have made these expenses had it not been
for the contract and furthermore, the expenses represented a loss. Id. While Continental owned the patent on the
system and could always find another partner, Autotrol had invested its money in research and materials that
could not be used on another project. Id. at 691. Engineers employed on the project would have been paid their
regular salaries ($700,000) even without the Continental contract. Id. at 692. However, they would have been
employed on another (potentially profitable) project if not for the contract with Continental. Autotrol, 918 F.2d
at 689.
116. See, e.g., June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic
Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REV. 953, 957-60 (1991) (using contract and restitutionary remedies
in discussion of damages).
117. See, e.g., Carbone & Brinig, supra note 116 (using contract and restitutionary remedies in discussion
of damages); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225
(1998) (stating that marriage is governed by emotional as well as societal norms that fill gaps in the formal
marriage contract); Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with
Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67 (1993) (suggesting that
when one spouse is disadvantaged because of the marital division of labor, the other should be required to do
the equivalent of a partnership buyout on divorce); Martha M. Ertman, Marriage As A Trade: Bridging The
Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2001) (stating that parties to intimate relationships
should be able to contract enforceably). But see Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage As Contract,
Opportunistic Violence, And Other Bad Arguments For Fault Divorce, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 719, 742-47
(suggesting that alimony is not really like contract damages because the contract promises are hard to sort out
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that surface readily as we try to explain rules for sorting out couples' finances following
divorce. Divorce can be described as an occasion of breach,1 18 dissolution of the
marriage contract, 119 or a contract terminable at will. 120 A dissolving marriage seems
like any other failed enterprise but involves problems that go beyond the simple
dissolution of a relationship. Like a sliding house of cards, a dissolving marriage includes
numerous other agreements made in the expectation that the relationship would
continue. 12 1 It is these "side deals," which resemble the contract-specific investment
made by Spur and Basalt in the problem, that I would like to address here.
David taught contracts for thirty years. Matthew Bender published his casebook,
12 2
and he had numerous articles to his credit. 123 He was clearly an authority in the field. I
was not as experienced. Unlike some contracts doctrines, which I have not systematically
thought about since my own law school experience, damages seemed familiar ground to
me. Our discussions regarding damages remained interesting and fruitful until shortly
before David's death. I am glad that at least a segment of the project-the part where our
two interests overlapped and where I, like generations of students, learned from David-
will be available to a wider audience.
Although damages are taught in the first term of contracts at the Iowa College of
Law, and I have taught only in the second term, I had worked through many of the
damages cases before coming to Iowa and in addition have taught remedies for a number
of years. In fact, my first purely theoretical work in family law was entitled The Reliance
Interest in Marriage and Divorce,124 and I have written other family law articles dealing
with damages as well. 12 5 In short, I had thought through the issues and read enough to
have my own views. Of course, I was neither as learned nor as confident about them as
was David, but I do think I have a fairly good grasp of the problems posed by asymmetric
and are left necessarily unenforceable).
118. See Brinig & Carbone, supra note 95, at 867 (suggesting that no breach is possible after no-fault for
the contract itself, though "side deals" may be protected); Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage
and Opportunism, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 869, 879-81 (1994) (explaining how the marriage contract has become
illusory).
119. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, 207 (1888) (describing various laws governing the dissolution
of a marriage contract).
120. See Brinig & Crafton, supra note 118, at 880 (explaining how opportunism is affecting marriage).
121. See Brinig & Carbone, supra note 95, at 877-82 (explaining the effects of lost opportunities during
marriage).
122. DAVID H. VERNON, CONTRACTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1991).
123. See, e.g., David H. Vernon, Expectancy Damages for Breach of Contract: A Primer and Critique,
1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 179, 186 (arguing that under the market damage measure, a breaching party is indifferent
between performance and breach); David H. Vernon, A Week to Remember: Of Pregnant Cows, Slipped Horses,
Sterile Bulls, Chickens, Heifers, and the Human Animal, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 403 (1982) (discussing mistake
cases in first year contracts); David H. Vernon, Cases on the Law of Contracts, by Laurence P. Simpson, 35
TEX. L. REV. 156 (1956) (book review).
124. Brinig & Carbone, supra note 95, at 855.
125. See Margaret F. Brinig, Rings and Promises, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 203 (1990) (dealing with remedies
for breach of engagement promises including forfeiture of a bond in the form of the engagement ring); Brinig &
Crafton, supra note 118, at 869 (considering the incentive effects of removing fault sanctions in alimony, which
arguably can be seen as damages for breaching marriage vows); Margaret F. Brinig, Property Distribution
Physics, The Talisman of Time and Middle Class Law, 31 FAM. L.Q. 93 (1997) [hereinafter Brinig, Physics]
(considering the various ways of distributing the gains, including human capital gains, as well as the losses
flowing from failed marriages).
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contracts-the ones in which one party must perform well before the other. 126
Perhaps my concern with distributive fairness in asymmetric performance contracts
comes from my graduate school experience, during which I remember discussing a
railroad and railroad mine case much like that of Spur and Basalt. The interest there was
in reducing the risks for firms that might need to make large contract-specific
investments. 127 If one who reaped the benefit of the contract first could breach after
recouping the investment without paying off the nonbreaching party, these contracts
would never be undertaken in the first place. Since these contracts were often essential to
the developing American economy (particularly along the frontier), 128 economists
rationalized that encouraging them made long-term sense.
More likely, though, my concern for distributive fairness comes from my everyday
thinking and writing about families with problems, particularly divorcing couples. In
marriage, the interests are in encouraging spouses to be self-sacrificing for the well being
of each other and of the marriage itself.129 In other words, more than the single
timeframe, and even more than the two contracting individuals, is involved. David and I
reached an impasse about damage awards in such losing contracts He told me I was
"absolutely wrong," and we ultimately eliminated the Spur and Basalt problem because
we were coming at this set of issues from two different perspectives.
Perhaps this vignette illuminates a larger and more profound debate between
academics in the commercial law area and those in family law. If the goals that the law of
commercial contracts facilitates are as I state them in the Understanding Contracts
chapter, 130 do they match up with the goals of family law? I think not. Family law, and
126. The discussion here will involve cases in which the parties may usually resort to the enforcement
mechanism of the courts. Cases in which the parties cannot rely on external enforcement are thoughtfully
discussed in Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 5 (1985).
127. For examples of the economics literature, none of which directly involves the mining train case, see
Bruce R. Lyons, Empirical Relevance of Efficient Contract Theory: Inter-firm Contracts, 12 OxFORD REV.
ECON. POL'Y 27 (1996) (testing various theories empirically); Bruce R. Lyons, Contracts and Specific
Investment: An Empirical Test of Transaction Cost Theory, 3 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 257 (1994)
(discussing small subcontractors making specific inputs for customers in the engineering industry and stating
more than half the subcontractors avoided making efficient, specific investments); W. Bentley McLeod &
James M. Malcomson, Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market Contracts, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 811
(1993) (discussing take-or-pay contracts or specific investments by firms that appear to benefit only their
employees); Darlene C. Chisholm, Asset Specificity and Long-Term Contracts: The Case of the Motion-Pictures
Industry, 19 E. ECON. J. 143 (1993) (considering the high degree of vertical integration and concentration in the
motion picture industry, prevalence of star promotion systems, antitrust litigation, and the rise of competition in
the form of television all contributed to specific investments by studios and actors during the "Age of the
Studio").
128. See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH ET AL., GROWTH AND WELFARE IN THE AMERICAN PAST: A NEW
ECONOMIC HISTORY (1983) (explaining theories of growth as they relate to the establishment of infrastructure
such as railroads).
129. MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT: BEYOND THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE
FAMILY 18, 83 (2000) (stating that people marry because they believe that marriage will make them happy, and
within a marriage what makes one's spouse or child happy will also make them happy).
130. See supra Part I. Paraphrased, the goals are: (1) to encourage parties to create contracts that will leave
at least one of the parties better off and neither worse off (Pareto optimality), (2) to encourage parties to write
contracts that will cause the parties to perform when it is efficient for them to do so (adequate disclosure and
efficient allocation of risk), (3) to encourage efficient performance of valid contracts (appropriate handling of
agency costs), and (4) to enforce contracts in ways that advance the preceding three goals.
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particularly the law of husbands and wives, is not about a series of contracts. 13 1 The idea,
at any rate, is to make one contract and to stick with it. Family law does not contemplate
repeated contracting, 132 efficient breach, 133 or even something akin to the multiple short-
term contracts common to franchising. 134 Nor will specific performance of marital
obligations work very well, because the contract depends upon things being done in a
spirit of love. 135 In effect, as in the losing contracts cases discussed in the commercial
context, forcing spouses to continue trudging onward in a de facto "dead" marriage
would be akin to economically wasteful behavior.
Family law does not encourage efficient investments, as much as true believers in
the Chicago school would have it so. 13 6 Instead, it encourages investment in the
relationship and each other, without expectation of short-term reward. 137 Love, in the
13 1. Thus, there are no five-year marriages with options to renew, and parties cannot vary important terms
of the contract (particularly terms concerning support of each other and their children).
132. Some states have enacted laws requiring waiting periods before divorce. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §
20-91 (A)(9) (Michie 2002). Other laws require support of needy former spouses and require support of children
from all relationships, not just the latest. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 598.21 (2001); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 4059,
4070, 4071 (West 2002); see also State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001). Each of these laws makes
multiple marriages more difficult. Still, about two-thirds of divorced people remarry. UNITED STATES BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND REMARRIAGE IN THE 1990s 5 (1992) (reporting at least 54% of
women remarry, but there is a lower rate for black women); see also Larry L. Bumpass et al., Changing
Patterns of Remarriage in the U.S., 52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 747, 753 (1990) (stating that two-thirds to three-
fourths of divorced persons remarry).
133. Fred S. McChesney, Tortious Interference With Contract Versus "Efficient" Breach: Theory and
Empirical Evidence, 28 J. LEGAL. STUD. 131, 132 (1999) (suggesting efficient breach as a possible origin of
tortious interference). For some of my thinking on breach, see Margaret F. Brinig, Some Concerns About
Applying Economics to Family Law, in FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS (Martha Fineman &
Terence Dougherty eds.) (forthcoming 2002).
134. To get to the "efficient" or in my view "covenantal," relationship, one first needs permanence or at
least a very long time horizon. See BRINIG, supra note 129, at 6-7. In game theory terms, this would be
translated into an indefinite termination in a repeated game. See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF
COOPERATION 8-9 (1984) (explaining that in an infinitely repeated game, the best strategy is not to defect but to
play "tit for tat" in which cooperative moves will be reinforced with more cooperative moves-thus increasing
total benefits-but uncooperative moves will be "punished" by one round of uncooperative behavior); THOMAS
C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 5 (1963) (dissecting conflicting behavior in the bargaining
process); Alvin E. Roth & Francoise Schoumaker, Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining: An
Experimental Study, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 362, 371 (1983) (explaining that players expect their opponents to
expect equal payoffs).
135. For a good discussion of this problem, see Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi-Rents, Or "I
Gave Him the Best Years of My Life," 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 300 (1987).
136. See Margaret F. Brinig, Comment on Jana Singer's Alimony and Efficiency, 82 GEO. L.J. 2461, 2470-
73 (1994) [hereinafter Brinig, Comment] (criticizing Becker's efficiency analysis in the era in which both
spouses work outside the home and pointing out how no-fault divorce, "best interests" custody laws,
disallowance of interests in the other's earning capacity, and the elimination of periodic alimony in the vast
majority of cases all operate against such investment); see also Brinig, Physics, supra note 125, at 113-18
(arguing that "enhancements to earning capacity made during marriage are just another form of marital
investment," and discussing why they should not be subject to the fault rule of divorce in order to create a
fairness in divorcing couples).
137. Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor Into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1995)
(describing why contracts involving the exchange of homemaker services for money are not enforced); see also
Cooper v. Cooper, 17 N.E. 892, 894 (Mass. 1888) ("Labor in housekeeping was a small incident to a great
wrong ...."); Alexander v. Kuykendall, 63 S.E.2d 746, 747-48 (Va. 1951) (disallowing contractual recovery
by a putative wife because she acted out of love, rather than hope of reward). The Alexander court reasoned:
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ideal, is unconditional, 13 8 not the subject of continued renegotiation coupled with threats
of breaking off the relationship. 139 In some ways, as Saul Levmore put it, marriage is "a
love it or leave it" relationship. 140 Families, even less than the Wisconsin corporations
studied by Stewart Macaulay, 14 1 do not operate either as a "nexus of contracts" or under
continued pressure to sue if there is a breach. Large outstanding balances are encouraged,
while faith in the other person and in the marriage keeps the marriage "business" running,
even when marginal revenue is less than average cost. Given this sort of thought
process-in which covenant is more common than contract-it is unsurprising that
family lawyers and state legislatures hesitate before enacting laws that might discourage
investment in these marriages, even for a dream or for "hedonic" reasons. 
142
Most of us spend years before marriage comparison shopping without full
information, 14 3 for marriage partners are in some sense "credence goods" 144 value of
Not business or money, but wedlock is what the parties contemplate. They are, or should be,
motivated by love and affection to form a mutual and voluntary compact to live together as
husband and wife, until separated by death, for the purpose of mutual happiness, establishing a
family, the continuance of the race, the propagation of children, and the general good of society.
Id; see also Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 661 P.2d 196 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (upholding the use of the installment
method for restitution damages for divorce); see generally, Margaret F. Brinig, The Influence of Marvin v.
Marvin on Housework During Marriage, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1311 (2001) [hereinafter Influence of
Marvin] (arguing that while homemaking contributions should be valued at the end of marriage-a positive
contribution of Marvin-regarding marriage as a series of contracts destroys much of its value).
138. See Margaret F. Brinig & Steven Nock, "I Only Want Trust": Norms, Trust and Autonomy, (SSRN
Elec. Library, Working Paper No. 269289, 2001) [hereinafter Brinig & Nock, "I Only Want Trust"] (illustrating
that the normative exception of unconditional love is the basis for trust that a relationship will function
appropriately); Margaret Brinig & Steven Nock, Covenant and Contract, 12 REGENT U. L. REv. 9 (2000);
Margaret F. Brinig, Equality and Sharing: Views of Households Across the Iron Curtain, 7 EUR. J. L. & ECON.
55 (1998) (explaining the difference between the East German regime of requiring equal work hours for each
spouse and the West German regime of allowing spouses to set their own schedules and arguing that forcing
equal division, while it encourages labor force participation by wives, apparently also created less stability in
the East German marriages).
139. See STEPHEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 586-87 (2d. ed. 2001) (citing cases
regarding the adjustment of contractual relations); Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, Separate Spheres
Bargaining and the Marriage Market, 101 J. POL. ECON. 988 (1993).
140. Saul Levmore, Unconditional Relationships, 76 B.U. L. REV. 807, 825-26 (1996).
141. See Macaulay, supra note 33, at 55 (discussing findings concerning when contract is and is not used
by businesses and law firms in the Wisconsin area).
142. In labor economics, the term refers to nonprice qualities that affect the worker's decisions. See
Jennifer A. Roback, Wages, Rents, and Amenities-Differences Among Workers and Regions, 26 ECON. INQ.
23, 23 (1988) (arguing that one cannot easily apply the "hedonic" price paradigm to the problem of urban
amenities because of the difficulties associated with comparing various worker's subjective demands to two
variable markets-the land and labor markets-simultaneously); Jennifer A. Roback, Wages, Rents, and the
Quality of Life, 90 J. POL. ECON. 1257 (1982) (arguing that regional wage differences are a function of local
attributes).
143. PAULA ENGLAND & GEORGE FARKAS, HOUSEHOLDS, EMPLOYMENT AND GENDER 31-42 (1991)
(describing the spousal search process); Margaret F. Brinig & Michael V. Alexeev, Fraud in Courtship,
Annulment and Divorce, 2 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 45 (1995) (analyzing annulment and divorce and showing that a
socially optimal amount of fraud exists in marriage); Margaret F. Brinig, In Search of Prince Charming, 4 J.
GENDER, RACE & JUST. 321, 323-35 (2001); see generally Steven Shavell, Acquisition and Disclosure of
Information Prior to Sale, 25 RAND J. ECON. 20 (1994) (regarding oil deposits); Omri Ben-Shahar & Lisa
Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law, 109 YALE L.J. 1885 (2000) (suggesting that a hidden, secrecy-
related cost to obtaining compensation accounts for the businessman's hostility to the economist's notions of
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which must be accepted on faith. When we do decide to marry, it is because, most of the
time, we "love" the other person.145 Perhaps, we are programmed to select well. 146
However, once we are in marriage, we continue to make decisions, or what I have
elsewhere referred to as "side deals." 14 7 We decide where we will live, whether we will
have children, and who will stay home to care for them.
Not every financial loss incurred in reliance on the continued sharing of the
other spouse's income is compensable. Distinction is necessarily drawn
between compensable and noncompensable reliance losses by reference to the
purpose of the behavior which gave rise to it. The spouse who sacrifices career
prospects to care for the couple's children, in reliance upon the other spouse's
income, has a claim for that reliance loss; the spouse who sacrifices career
prospects to pursue a passion for golf, in reliance upon the other spouse's
income, does not. But if the spousal earning disparity continues, then as their
marriage lengthens both develop an expectation to share their spouse's income
the loss of which is presumptively compensable .... 148
Professor Ellman's confinement of "rational" investment 149 to two categories
(investment in careers and career loss occasioned by care of a dependent)150 again points
out (as he notes) the problems with trying to work from a law-and-economics-driven
efficient breach).
144. Brinig & Alexeev, supra note 143, at 145; Philip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J.
POL. ECON. 311, 311 (1970). Credence goods are like work done inside an automobile or operations done while
a person is unconscious. To have some idea (right at the time) of the quality of the work done (and whether or
not the price paid is fair), one must trust the reputation of the mechanic or surgeon. See Michael Darby & Edi
Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68-69 (1973).
145. See Brinig & Alexeev, supra note 143, at 49 (explaining that divorce or annulment of a marriage is a
function of asymmetrical information at "contract" formation).
146. GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 325-27 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing how participants in
marriage markets are assumed to have limited information, and suggesting that traits of people would be
positively sorted in the marriages generated by efficient markets with full information); Gary S. Becker, A
Theory of Marriage, in ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY: MARRIAGE, CHILDREN AND HUMAN CAPITAL: A
CONFERENCE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH (Theodore Schultz ed., 3d ed.
1974) (discussing assortative mating).
147. Brinig, Comment, supra note 136, at 2466.
148. PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 102, § 5.05, cmt. at 204 (Tentative Draft 1995).
149. "Financially rational sharing behavior" is discussed in Ira M. Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL.
L. REv. 1, 58-60 (1989). Professor Ellman excludes lifestyle choices, stating:
[i]n this example, the couple's rejection of the San Francisco-Houston move is not financially
rational; it results from nonfinancial preferences in matters such as geography, lifestyle, and
climate. For most people, these preferences will have a strong influence on their decisions when the
differences in income are relatively small. People sometimes indulge such preferences even where
the income differences are great. When a couple foregoes economic opportunity to satisfy their
nonfinancial preferences, little adjustment is required if they later divorce. Divorce does not
distribute the benefit of their decision inequitably; both still retain the advantage of living in San
Francisco. The real question is whether we should permit the husband in our example to establish a
claim by proving that he gave up Houston entirely to accommodate his wife, that he, unlike she,
had no special fondness for San Francisco.
Id. at 61.
150. Ira M. Ellman, Should the Theory of Alimony Include Nonfinancial Losses and Motivations?, 1991
BYU L. REV. 259, 270-71.
2002]
The Journal of Corporation Law
contractual approach' 5' to one that will work in family law.
Consideration of hedonic damage in torts1 52 has perplexed generations of law
students, academics, and judges. 153 Should we award additional (or lower) damages to
someone when another's tortuous act has affected the victim's ability to appreciate life or
even the compensation for out-of-pocket losses? 154 What do we do, if instead of being
dead, the victim is now in a vegetative state? 155 Is loss of awareness preferable to the
pain and frustration suffered by, say, Christopher Reeve?
The ability to enjoy life in all its richness unquestionably figures heavily in our
desire to marry and, especially, in the myriad of decisions we make as spouses and
parents. 156 Putting aside such obvious hedonic decisions as vacations, 157 we might select
151. Id. at 264.
152. See, e.g., Poyzer v. McGraw, 360 N.W.2d 748, 753 (Iowa 1985) (refusing to allow the submission of
loss of enjoyment of life as a separate element of damages); Sterner v. Wesley Coll., 747 F. Supp. 263, 273 (D.
Del. 1990) (refusing to allow a distinct basis of recovery under a survival action statute for the decedent's loss
of life); see generally Annotation, Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a Distinct Element or Factor in Awarding
Damages for Bodily Injury, 34 A.L.R. 4TH 293, 300-04 (1984) (outlining the history of procuring damages
awards for loss of enjoyment of life); Ellen S. Pryor, The Challenge of Teaching Damages, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
817, 823 (2001) ("many cases on hedonic damages rule turn mostly on statutory construction"); Gretchen L.
Valentine, Comment, Hedonic Damages as an Emerging Issue in Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Claims,
10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 543, 555-56 (1990) (finding that hedonic damages case law divided into two categories:
personal injury and wrongful death).
153. Compare Nathan P. Feisinger, Current Legislation Affecting Breach of Promise to Marry, Alienation
of Affections, and Related Actions, 10 WIS. L. REV. 417, 420 (1935) (noting recent laws enacted prohibiting
causes of action for breach of promise to marry), with Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320, 1325 (N.M. Ct. App.
1991) ("Even though one may question the utility of such comments, spouses are also free to express negative
opinions of one another. 'You look awful' or even 'I don't love you' can be very wounding, but these
statements cannot justify liability."). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, illus. 13 (1965) (you look
"'like a hippopotamus').
154. In contracts, hedonic damages, because they are related to pain and suffering, are excluded from
consideration. They are said to be reflected in prices. Otherwise they would be consequential damages, and fall
within the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341 (Ex. Ct. 1854). In the rare bad faith insurance case,
something akin to hedonic damages is awarded to the victim of an insurer's refusal to settle within policy limits
or to provide first-party coverage in a clear case. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1040 (Cal.
1973) (finding a duty of good faith unconditional for insurer); Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co. of New Haven, Conn., 426
P.2d 173, 178 (Cal. 1967) (finding insurer guilty of breach in a psychosis case). For an effort to compare
remedies, see David W. Barber, Remedies for Imperfect Transactions in Contracts and Torts, 38 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 193, 216 (2001).
155. See Michael B. Kelly, Reflections on Remedies, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 547, 554 (2000) ("The availability
of pain and suffering or hedonic damages to a comatose victim will be subjected to constant attack, making
slavish reference to precedent a relatively weak approach to securing a client's goals." (citing McDougald v.
Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372 (N.Y. 1989)); cf DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
193-94 (1989) (holding no private cause of action exists under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in a case in which social
services did not act to prevent child from being beaten into a coma by his father. The child "suffered brain
damage so severe that he is expected to spend the rest of his life confined to an institution for the profoundly
retarded."). For an argument that hedonic damages are not severable from emotional damages generally, or if
so, separation should be declared by the legislature, see Kyle R. Crowe, The Semantical Bifurcation of
Noneconomic Loss: Should Hedonic Damage Be Recognized Independently of Pain and Suffering Damage?, 75
IOWA L. REV. 1275, 1291-92, 1302 (1990); Erin O'Hara, Hedonic Damages For Wrongful Death: Are
Tortfeasors Getting Away With Murder?, 78 GEO. L.J. 1687, 1688 (1990); Andrew Jay McClurg, It's a
Wonderful Life: The Case for Hedonic Damages in Wrongful Death Cases, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 57, 93
(1990).
156. For a recent opinion dealing with this problem, see In re Marriage of Field, 110 Wash. App. 1059
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a career like teaching law not only because it is lucrative, but also because it presents us
with intellectual stimulation, the ability to be creative, the opportunity to spend time with
family during the week and to take vacations with them during the summers, a day a year
of medieval pageantry, and the luxury (sometimes) of ignoring everything else to get
engrossed in something that really interests one. If I choose to give up money and
perquisites of a commercial practice, and ask my spouse to give up a similar job to move
to a college town-say Iowa City or Charlottesville or Ithaca-is our decision rational
according to Professor Ellman's definition?
If my spouse does this for me-gives up a law partnership for a foundation job or
even teaching high school civics-it may be a wonderful thing for our relationship or
perhaps for our children, who can live in a house with a yard instead of a luxury
apartment, and who can have at least one parent around all the time. 15 8 But is my
sacrifice, made in love and for hedonic reasons, compensable if, down the pike, the
marriage does not last? 159 Professor Ellman says not. 160 The contracts answer would
have the hedonic part built into the price (if a small town life is so wonderful, the law
school will not have to pay as much to attract the perfect professor as would a school in a
big city, even taking cost-of-living differences into account). Assuming spouses can
make rational calculations, they will not undertake the move unless the immediate
rewards compensate the compliant spouse for the career sacrifice.
Even though for selfish reasons I do not think every law partner should turn in his or
her palm pilot and become a law teacher, I think such sacrifices are a good thing. But
should the former attomey-cum-foundation worker, who can support him- or herself after
(Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (adjudicating a case in which the couple, both physicians, wanted to work less at their
professions in order to have more time to spend with their children and the wife had taken care of the children
full-time for nine years preceding dissolution). This is why gender differences in conversations become so
baffling. See DEBORAH TANNEN, YOU JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND: WOMEN AND MEN IN CONVERSATION 23
(1990) (discussing linguistic complexities between men and women); JOHN GRAY, MEN ARE FROM MARS;
WOMEN ARE FROM VENUS 59 (1992) (noting different words and meanings between the sexes); Randy Frances
Kandel, Power Plays: A Sociolinguistic Study of Inequality in Child Custody Mediation and a Hearsay Analog
Solution, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 879, 899-900 (1994) (noting constructed dialogue may transform meaning of
message).
157. See DEAN G. PRUITTr, NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR (1981) (describing the bargaining between a
hypothetical husband and his wife about their vacation choices of mountains or beach); see also Daniela E. H.
Damian et al., An Empirical Study of Facilitation of Computer-mediated Distributed Requirements Negotiations
abst. (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Calgary) (on file with The Journal of Corporation
Law) (describing group facilitation as an essential element of group approaches to Requirements Engineering
(RE) and illustrating the different social behaviors when dealing with a facilitator and when without); Donna
Dosman & Wiktor Adamowicz, Combining Stated and Revealed Preference Data to Construct an Empirical
Examination of Intrahousehold Bargaining abst. (2002) (unpublished Staff Paper 2-01, University of Alberta,
Canada) (on file with author) (discussing household decisions as a bargaining process "in the context of
determining the location of family recreation vacation choice." The study resulted in an empirical model,
providing information on factors affecting bargaining power with the household decision.).
158. Cf NICOLA KRAUS & EMMA MCLAUGHLIN, THE NANNY DIARIES (2002) (discussing the complicated
lives of two-career families in which children are largely raised by their au pairs).
159. Cf Silbaugh, supra note 137 (contending that housework is not legally compensated as set forth in a
variety of legal doctrines).
160. See Reporter's Notes to American Law Institute, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Tent. Draft No. 1, at 205 (1995) (providing an example of giving up a
career for golf).
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the divorce, 16 1 be, in effect, stuck with what seemed best because it was good for the
professor-spouse? If one really wants to live in Iowa City, she finishes the marriage with
her ideal job in an ideal location. But her spouse is now stuck in the middle of nowhere
with depreciated labor force skills1 62 and years of lost networking and seniority-driven
status.
163
This example resembles the Spur-Basalt problem that David Vernon and I talked
about. It does not make any sense to continue what was once a mutually wonderful
marriage when things will run quickly into the ground. 164 But it also seems most unfair
to stick the nonprofessor spouse with the loss not only of marriage, but also of an entire
lifestyle. 16 5 The modem divorce rules allow easy exit when either spouse wants out. 166
For many reasons, not the least of which is to cure asymmetrical power dynamics
(particularly physical ones), no-fault divorce aids women. 167 Nonrecognition of sacrifices
161. Divorce ought to be less common in such cases. Perhaps this greater certainty is itself an adequate
reward. Perhaps the nonacademic will learn to love the new life. But see BETTY HARPER FUSSELL, MY
KITCHEN WARS (2000) (describing, not very enthusiastically, one New Jersey college town with its seemingly
forced entertaining competition between faculty wives).
162. See VICTOR FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY (1988) (arguing that in accounting
for family contributions by spouses, one must keep in mind what is a wise social policy to encourage);
ENGLAND & FARKAS, supra, note 143, at 156-58 (discussing the amount that a person's wages decline when
they leave and then re-enter the job market); Brinig, Physics, supra note 125, at 104-07 (arguing that investment
in marriage justifies an entitlement to future income).
163. See Gaurang Mitu Gulati & Devon Carbado, Conversations at Work, 79 OR. L. REV. 103, 109 (2000)
(examining how stereotypes of workplace outsiders, such as minorities and women, affects employer-employee
dynamics and the workload the outside employee is expected to bear); Felice Schwartz, Management Women
and the New Facts of Life, 67 HARV. BUS. REV. 65, 69-70 (1989) (arguing that management should create a
more flexible working schedule for those career women who are family-minded as opposed to career-primary
women).
164. For an old argument, see John Dryden:
Why should a foolish marriage vow, which long ago was made, Oblige us to each other now
When passion is decay'd? We lov'd, and we lov'd, as long as we could, Till our love was lov'd out
in us both: But our marriage is dead, when the pleasure is fled: 'Twas pleasure first made it an oath.
If I have pleasures for a friend, And farther love in store, What wrong has he whose joys did
end, And who could give no more? 'Tis a madness that he should be jealous of me, Or that I should
bar him of another: For all we can gain is to give ourselves pain, When neither can hinder the other.
John Dryden, Why Should a Foolish Marriage Vow, in MARRIAGE A-LA-MODE (1673), available at
http://www.library.utoronto.ca/utel/rp/poems/drydenl0.html. (last visited Oct. 24, 2002); see also Lawrence M.
Friedman, A Dead Language: Divorce Law and Practice Before No-Fault, 86 VA. L. REV. 1497, 1529 (2000)
(arguing, in vain, for "companionate divorce"); James Herbie DiFonzo, Customized Marriage, 75 IND. L.J. 875,
894 (2000) (illustrating a British reform document that made divorce rather like a coroner's inquest); Robert J.
Levy, Trends in Legislative Regulation of Family Law Doctrine: Millennial Musings, 33 FAM. L.Q. 543, 548
(1999) (noting that although only eight states adopted the UMDA's, Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 9A
U.L.A. Part 1, 159, 160 (Master ed. 1998), divorce provisions more or less intact, almost every state
substantially modified its statutory grounds for divorce, while no state followed "in recognizable form" its
marriage doctrines). The UMDA was amended in 1971 and 1973. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT §§ 101-
309, 9A(1) U.L.A. 159 (1998); Id. §§ 310-506, 9A(2) U.L.A.1 (1999).
165. Compare the Cinderella existence in Pfohl v. Pfohl, 345 So. 2d 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
166. Law and economics scholars term them unilateral. See H. Elizabeth Peters, Marriage and Divorce:
Informational Constraints and Private Contracting, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 437, 449 (1986) (arguing that in
applying the Coase Theorem, unilateral divorce does not itself increase the divorce rate, but does change the
distribution of financial resources on divorce).
167. Women are the partner most likely to file for divorce and are even more likely to do so in no-fault
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does not, 168 even, and especially, when they do not make financial sense. 169
Ellman concludes that what the law ought to do is merely remove disincentives that
might otherwise drive people not to act in the best interests of their spouse or
marriage. 170 But are people in happy, ongoing marriages influenced in the slightest by
the share of marital property they might get on divorce? I think not. There are several
problems. One is that couples invariably are overoptimistic about their own marriage's
permanence, at least when they are engaged. 17 1 Another is that imagining that laws have
this kind of influence means that spouses in happy marriages must at least subconsciously
be involved in exchange behavior1 72 (tit for tat) 173 rather than unconditional love. 174 In
fact, happy couples do not tend to keep track of how much each contributes at any given
time.175 To them, concentrating on the particular moment seems unimportant, because
marriage exists in past memories and expectations of the future. 176
Both the information problem and the overenthusiasm problem have their analogies
in the corporate world as well. Some academics are concerned about over optimism in the
purchase of securities 1 77 and offer disclosure laws as an antidote. Likewise, some courts
have allowed, perhaps overenthusiasticly, consumers to avoid policies unsuitable for
states. Margaret F. Brinig & Douglas W. Allen, "These Boots Are Made for Walking": Why Most Divorce
Filers Are Women, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 126 (2000).
168. See Brinig, Physics, supra note 125, at 109 (explaining the losses borne by divorced spouses after the
divorce); Brinig, Influence of Marvin, supra note 137 (explaining how to value the contributions of a
homemaker during marriage).
169. Lloyd Cohen provides a rationale of differences in the timing of returns on "investment" in marriage
and his frustration with other possible remedies like "specific performance." Cohen, supra note 135, at 200-01.
170. Ellman, supra note 150, at 265.
171. See Lynn A. Baker & Robert Emery, When Every Relationship is Above Average: Perceptions and
Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 443 (1993) (explaining the
optimism with which engaged people who have applied for marriage licenses expect alimony and child support
following divorce and are over-optimistic about the likelihood that their marriage will last for their lifetimes).
172. See Steven L. Nock, Turn-Taking as Rational Behavior, 27 Soc. SCI. RES. 235, 239-41 (1998)
(arguing that the spouses in happy marriages do not expect immediate rewards). For a full explanation, see Gary
L. Hansen, Moral Reasoning and the Marital Exchange Relationship, 131 J. Soc. PSYCH. 71 (1991).
173. This term comes from ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 20 (1984).
174. Were the laws to have influence, they would be involved in the economist's game of the Prisoner's
Dilemma. See JACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 518-19 (4th ed. 1988) (describing such
games). The idea is that two prisoners accused of a common crime are separated and then questioned. Each is
told that if he confesses, he will get a reduced punishment. If neither confesses, both will go free because there
will not be enough evidence to convict. The theory is that they will both confess if they remain isolated because
for each of them confession represents the lowest risk strategy. For applications of this idea to marriage, see,
e.g., Antony W. Dnes, Application of Economic Analysis to Marital Law: Concerning a Proposal to Reform the
Discretionary Approach to the Division of Marital Assets in England And Wales, 19 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
533, 538-40 (1999); Milton C. Regan, Market Discourse and Moral Neutrality in Divorce Law, 1994 UTAH L.
REV. 605, 646; Scott & Scott, supra note 117, at 1278, 1294 n. 113.
175. See Brinig & Nock, "I Only Want Trust," supra note 138 (explaining that an attribute of unconditional
love is not scrupulously keeping track of separate contributions).
176. See Steven L. Nock, Time and Gender in Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1971, 1971-87 (2000) (arguing
that marriage is not like contract because marriage is experienced mainly in the future and in the past, where as
contracts embody temporal assumptions that envision the future as predicated on the present).
177. See Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities
Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611,636 (1995) (using the analogy of a "Lake Wobegon Market"). Id. at 636.
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them, 178 and legislatures have enacted so-called "lemon laws" 179 and other private
remedies1 80 to guard against momentary lapses in consumers' judgments. In general,
courts have policed "bad faith" in contracting 18 1and, particularly, have sought to deter
parties from using minor excuses to terminate long-term contracts when others have been
waiting in the wings 182 or when termination would work substantial forfeitures. 
183
In the end, public policy favors laws set up to maximize behavior that is not profit-
maximizing in the financial sense (even though housework may increase GNP 184 and
maximize gains from specialization1 85 and efficiencies of scale). 186 This thought itself
178. Anderson v. Knox, 297 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1961) (holding misrepresentations were made concerning
the suitability of an insurance program); see also Sanghera v. Orefice, 191 F.3d 461 (9th Cir. 1999) (describing
"vanishing premium" life insurance); see generally Alan M. Weinberger, Let the Buyer Be Well Informed?-
Doubting the Demise of Caveat Emptor, 55 MD. L. REV. 387 (1966) (arguing that the enactment of state
disclosure statutes on sellers is deterring the erosion of the doctrine of caveat emptor).
179. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-20A-1 (1993) (allowing consumers a private cause of action against a
manufacturer who does not allow return when car is nonconforming; refers to cause of action found in ALA.
CODE § 8-20A-3 (1990)); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-105-201 (Michie 2001) (general consumer remedy for assisted
devices when goods are nonconforming); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.23 (West 1998) (regarding automobiles and
requiring decal advising purchaser of buyback deal).
180. See, e.g., Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 648 (N.J. 1971) (enjoining a seller of a package of
"educational" material from engaging in deceptive practices or misrepresentations and awarding damages under
Consumer Fraud Act as class action); In re Fleet, 95 BR. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that under New Jersey
law, a bait-and-switch technique used by a financial counseling service was a deceptive trade act).
181. Greer Props. Inc. v. LaSalle Nat'l. Bank, 874 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1989); see generally Muris, supra
note 48, at 541 (explaining that courts applying the U.C.C.'s provision do not take into account good faith as
opposed to when they apply the common law).
182. See McChesney, supra note 133, at 131 (arguing that the doctrine of tortious interference should be
favored over the efficient breach model).
183. See Burger King Corp. v. Family Dining, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 485, 493 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (finding that the
franchisor was not entitled to have a condition strictly enforced because that would involve divesting the
franchisee of territorial exclusivity which would amount to a forfeiture); see generally Steven J. Burton, Breach
of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369 (1980) (discussing
the tension in franchising contracts between express terminable-at-will provisions and implied terms to
terminate in good faith); Steven J. Burton, Good Faith Performance of a Contract Within Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 67 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (1981) (stating that good faith performance as used by the
courts serves to "effectuate the intentions of the parties, or protect their reasonable interests"); Steven J. Burton,
More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply to Professor Summers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 497, 499
(1984) (arguing that "courts generally do not use good faith doctrine to override the agreement of the parties");
Eric G. Anderson, Good Faith in Enforcement of Contracts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 299, 348-49 (1988) (arguing that
courts resort to a variety of techniques, including avoidance of forfeiture, to accommodate the parties' interests).
184. See, e.g., Morton Paglin, The Underground Economy: New Estimates from Household Income and
Expenditure Surveys, 103 YALE L.J. 2239, 2244 (1994).
At the public policy level, the lack of recognition of the economic value of housewives' work is
indicated by the fact that housework is included in the GNP only if it is paid work done by a
housekeeper.... [lI]t has been estimated that, if it were included, unpaid housework done in the
industrialized countries would constitute between 25 and 40 percent of the GNP.
SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 204 n.48 (1989) (citing DEBBIE TALYOR ET AL.,
WOMEN: A WORLD REPORT (1985)).
185. GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 30-53 (2d ed. 1991) (analyzing the divisions of labor
among family members as determined by biological and experiential differences).
186. See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the Perplexed,
54 TAX L. REV. 1, 28 (2000) (finding no marriage penalty tax if economies of scale are eliminated); Jagdeep S.
Bhandari & Lawrence A. Weiss, The Increasing Bankruptcy Filing Rate: An Historical Analysis, 67 AM.
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drives noneconomists crazy with Becker's theory. 187 Family law relationships follow the
public policy of behavior that is not necessarily profit-maximizing. In my view, couple
relationships seem most "efficient" when they produce intimacy, 188 and parenting
relationships seem most efficient when they allow children to flourish. 189
Like the Spur-Basalt problem, marriages that end in divorce are failing
enterprises. 190 The question is whether specific laws (or even concepts like status1 91 that
largely keep legal enforcement out of an ongoing enterprise 192) best encourage couples in
general-not a specific couple-to undertake the wonderful enterprise of marriage.193 At
the same time, policymakers want to do what is fair in the individual case at hand,
although this preference for individualized justice is more likely in family law than in
commercial contracts. 194 Should we let losses fall where they may because this will make
people smarter in their next marriage (or the marriage after that)? This idea seems rather
like that of former Dean Herma Hill Kay who argued that discontinuing permanent
alimony was appropriate to encourage married women to remain in the labor force. 195 Or
is the contracts analogy here more like a forfeiture, 196 which equity abhors? Consider
Professor Ellman's example of a wife who invests in her husband's degree but has a
BANKR. L.J. 1, 7 (1993) (stating loss of economies of scale upon divorce pushes some into bankruptcy).
187. Economist Gary Becker explains that because of the efficiency gains from specialization and their
comparative advantage at doing housework, in each marriage the woman will choose to do the majority of the
housework, the man to do most of the labor force work. Jana B. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered
Costs and Benefits of the Economic Justification for Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2423, 2437-53 (1994) (setting forth
the economic justifications for alimony and the feminist critiques of these justifications).
188. Accord MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY (1993) (introducing the
promises made during a relationship and their ultimate effect on children).
189. See BRINIG, supra note 47, at 18 (arguing that covenant allows intimacy to grow for couples and
encourages children to flourish); see also Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA.
L. REV. 2401, 2416, 2476 (1995) (explaining that privacy allows a filial bond between a parent and child to
flourish).
190. For one article looking at the similarities between the two, see Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley,
The Market for Deadbeats, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 201, 206 (1996) (asserting that both commercial and family
debtors who flee jurisdictions to escape payment are deadbeats).
191. See REGAN, supra note 188 (explaining the relationship between status and intimacy).
192. See Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1443, 1531-65 (explaining
the role of contracts in marital relationships).
193. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Justice Douglas famously wrote:
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the
degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
Id. at 486.
194. One constraint is the presence of children. Their best interest must be considered in any family law
decision, even overriding fairness to their parents. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.02
(stating best interests are of primary importance and fairness is of secondary importance). Safety of children
takes precedence over the parental rights of parents threatened with losing them by out of home placement or
termination of parental rights. 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(15)(A) (Supp. 2000).
195. Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California's No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 291, 309
(1987).
196. See generally Burger King v. Family Dining, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (explaining the
role of forfeiture in the enforcement of contracts).
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secret love interest on the side. 197 A contract analogy would at least allow her restitution
of her investment in the career. 198 However, what happens if we look only at losses and
not expectations (profits)?
19 9
Family law cases decided during the last two decades have typically not used
contract law at all,
20 0 but have sought to remove distortions that might be created by not,
at least, providing compensatory payments.2
0 1 Occasionally, in the degree cases, courts
have explicitly provided for restitution,
20 2 but have limited the award to the amount
contributed by the working spouse.
20 3 When the degree is treated as property, New York
courts do award some portion of the expectation of future profit.
20 4 But as June Carbone
197. Ellman, supra note 150, at 304. Carl Schneider also thinks there should be recovery for financially
nonrational decisions. Carl E. Schneider, Rethinking Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral Discourse, 1991
BYU L. REv. 197, 220, 222-24.
198. Similarly, even though a promisee has breached a contract "totally," he or she may be awarded some
of the benefit conferred on the nonbreaching party so as to avoid forfeiture. This is particularly true in the
construction cases where the breaching party was the contractor. See Kirkland v. Archbold, 113 N.E.2d 496,
500 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953) (citing 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 4123, 1475); Thermal Master, Inc. v. Greenhill,
1987 WL 17801 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 29, 1987); Kass v. Todd, 284 N.E.2d 590 (Mass. 1972). For application to
a personal service contract, see generally Britton v. Turner, 1834 WL 1176 (N.H. 1834).
This rule, by binding the employer to pay the value of the service he actually receives, and the
laborer to answer in damages where he does not complete the entire contract, will leave no
temptation to the former to drive the laborer from his service near the close of his term, by ill-
treatment, in order to escape from payment; nor to the latter to desert his service before the
stipulated time, without a sufficient reason ....
Id. at *10.
199. See Brinig, Physics, supra note 125 (explaining the role of human capital gains and losses in
distribution at divorce and arguing that not only reliance losses but also expected gains should be shared on
divorce).
200. See In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo. 1978) (stating an advanced degree education of
one spouse is not marital property and cannot be divided on dissolution); In re Marriage of Weinstein, 470
N.E.2d 551, 560 (Il. App. Ct. 1984) (considering relevant factors, such as earning potential and spousal
financial contribution, when awarding shares of marital estate); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527 (N.J.
1982) (holding that courts may not make permanent distribution of value of professional degrees and licenses
unless spouse received from partner a financial contribution for this education).
201. See Mahoney, 453 A.2d at 535 (stating spouses supported through professional school may have to
"reimburse the supporting spouses for the financial contribution they received in pursuit of their professional
training").
202. See DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Minn. 1981) (awarding wife restitution for
finaincial contributions made to her husband during his medical schooling); In re Marriage of Francis, 442
N.W.2d 59, 66 (Iowa 1989) (basing the formula for reimbursement alimony on husband's future earning
capacity and wife's contribution to its attainment).
203. See Mahoney, 453 A.2d at 535 (holding that the working spouse is only entitled to the money
contributed to the other spouse's education); DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d at 758 (upholding a reward granting
financial support given by the working spouse); Inman v. Inman, 478 S.W.2d 266, 269-70 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979)
(apportioning to the spouse who provided support "the amount spent for direct support and school expenses
during the period of education, plus reasonable interest and adjustments for inflation," when "there is little or no
marital property acquired through the increased earning capacity provided by the supported spouse's degree or
training").
204. See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 717 (N.Y. 1985) (stating a license to practice medicine
acquired during the marriage is a marital asset); McSparron v. McSparron, 662 N.E.2d 745, 748 (N.Y. 1995)
(holding that a spouse who contributes to the other spouse's professional license is entitled to an equitable share
thereof).
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and I noted more than ten years ago, courts do not seem to realize even in a losing
venture like a marriage ending in divorce, similar to the termination of a contract at will,
compensation paid out by the party seeking to pull out cannot be limited to the bare
amount expended by the other party. There must be some return on the money-a
reasonable rate of return on the money reflecting the riskiness of the investment made by
the other party.
20 5
If we wanted to limit such investments to obvious expenditures on human capital
like degrees, there would be some economic, as opposed to practical, 20 6 reasons for
doing so.20 7 The economic reason lies in the desire to encourage the growth of GNP and
205. A counterargument is that treating the degree as nonmodifiable property will force the newly degreed
spouse to live at least up to the average earned in the profession.
A third criticism of earning capacity awards is the suggestion that although such awards may be
fair when given in other contexts, they may be unfair when given in the property distribution
context because they force the professional spouse to follow the occupation he or she is licensed
in, or at least one as lucrative. Thus, in earning capacity based awards, a spouse's career options
are quite restricted because a court has financially strapped him or her to his or her licensed
profession using the nonmodifiable property award. These awards necessarily assume that the
earnings projections of the court will be achieved, when, in fact, the opportunity to practice a
profession is not a guarantee that any, much less the average, income of that profession actually
will be earned.
Eric Julian Mayer, For Richer or Poorer-Equities in the Career-Threshold, No-Asset Divorce, 58 TUL. L.
REV. 791, 813 (1984). For a more recent description, see Alicia Brokars Kelly, Marital Partnership Pretense
And Career Assets: The Ascendancy Of Self Over The Marital Community, 81 B.U. L. REv. 59 (2001), in which
she notes:
The second, more critical concern, is for the effect on the enhanced spouse's ability to follow or
not to follow a career path according to his own free choice, a choice that is free from any
constraints flowing from divorce. What if the professional wanted to change careers, to accept a
job for lesser compensation, or to quit all together, and to become say, a poet? The divorce award
could seriously impair his freedom to do so. As one court explains, a "professional in training
who is not finally committed to a career choice when the distributive award is made may be
locked into a particular kind of practice simply because the monetary obligations imposed by the
distributive award.., leaves him or her no alternative .... [E]quitable distribution was not
intended to permit a judge to make a career decision for a... spouse .... ["]
Id. at 116-117 (citing Dewitt v. Dewitt, 296 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980); O'Brien, 489 N.E. at 720
(Meyer, J., concurring)). One court has even gone as far as to consider this potential slavery within the meaning
of the Thirteenth Amendment. Severs v. Severs, 426 So. 2d 992 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
206. See Ellman, supra note 149, at 53-73, 81 (arguing that if we do not limit expenditures on human
capital, we will necessarily be stuck with the problem of valuing other than "economically rational"
investments). But see Brinig, Physics, supra note 125, at 96-99, 105-106, 109-13 (arguing sacrifices of time and
talent that increase a spouse's income enhancing capacity, whether or not they lead to advanced degrees, ought
to be as compensable as the degrees).
207. One court has suggested that changing the idea of marital property for degree cases only displays a
kind of elitism:
The question, then, is whether there should be a different rule and a different basic jurisprudence
which would place on a strictly commercial basis the financial contributions made by one spouse
during the marriage to the other spouse's education and training in order that that contribution
alone be commercially recompensed. Unless the spouses themselves have otherwise agreed, we
think not, even if the marriage terminates before the expected "fruits" of the education and training
are borne.
The claim of special recompense is based on the notion that there are unique considerations
involved when one spouse's financial contribution is made in order to enable the other to obtain a
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thus human capital that is directly tied to productivity. Increases in patents, 20 8 or in
degrees in science and engineering, 20 9 would seem the obvious cases. These are like
investments in the railroads2 10 or other infrastructures that have made America so
productive historically. 2 11 These are the contract-specific investments we might as a
society want to encourage. 2 12 Arguably, however, any rule allowing returns from
investment in a spouse's career should extend to any provable increase in a spouse's
human capital. 213
III. CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT DAMAGES
The four law and economics goals of contract damages help explain a wide variety
of puzzles for the contracts student. For example, the discussion of goals should help
show why punitive 2 14 and consequential damages 215 are not collected in contracts cases.
A caricature of law and economics as applied to contracts does not recognize any "moral
quality to promise making and promise keeping." 2 16 Thus there should be no additional
damages paid to the "victim" of an "efficient breach," because the breaching party by
professional degree or license. In our view, that claim represents a kind of elitism which
inappropriately depreciates the value of all the other types of contributions made to each other by
other spouses pursuing different life styles and responding in their individual ways to their life
experiences.
Mahoney v. Mahoney, 442 A.2d 1062, 1070 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982), rev'd, 453 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1982).
208. Paul M. Romer, Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth, 94 J. POL. EcON. 1002 (1986).
209. Paul M. Romer, Should the Government Subsidize Supply or Demand in the Market for Scientists and
Engineers? 772 (working paper, 2000), http://www.nber.org/papers/w7723 (last visited Sept. 16, 2002).
210. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH ET AL., GROWTH & WELFARE IN THE AMERICAN PAST: A NEW ECONOMIC
HISTORY 79, 101-10 (3d ed. 1983) (noting that human capital accumulation provided the essential skilled labor
force that was so important to obtaining high levels of productivity in both manufacturing and agriculture,
railroads dramatically lowered shipping costs and, therefore, the costs of producing goods, and the return of
investment in human capital is higher for society than for the individual); ROBERT FOGEL, RAILROADS AND
AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH: ESSAYS IN ECONOMETRIC HISTORY 223 (1964) (noting that social savings of
the railroad was approximately five percent of the gross national product in 1890).
211. For a general discussion, see THEODORE W. SCHULTZ, THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF
AGRICULTURE, ch. VII (1953) (determining that overall rate of return on research in agriculture is about thirty
percent). For some applications, see Charles I. Jones & John C. Williams, Measuring the Social Return to R&D,
113 Q.J. ECON. 119 (1998) (discussing the results of new growth theory and its implications on social rate of
return to R&D); Josh Lemer, The Government as Venture Capitalist: The Long-Run Impact of the SBIR
Program, 72 J. BUS. 285 (1999).
212. This of course would be an argument for the Ph.D. in microbiology or engineering, but not the law
degree, unless one can argue that lawyers add value to the economy by structuring contracts that enhance
investment. They obviously do enhance investment if they are facilitating patent acquisition. See, e.g., Deborah
Ben-Canaan, Despite a Down Economy, Attorneys are Still in Demand, SAN DIEGO DAILY, Apr. 30, 2002,
http://www.sddt.com/reports/2002/04/lawweekwed/td.cfm (last visited Sept. 16, 2002). Attorneys do not
enhance investment if they are defending criminals or, arguably, handling divorce cases. Id.
213. Alternatively, a noncontract remedy could be used-the so-called equitable lien favored in former
civil law jurisdictions. For examples of how the equitable lien works in the family law context, see Robinson v.
Robinson, 429 N.E.2d 183 (II1. App. Ct. 1981) (involving a wife and husband who made improvements on
property that belonged to the husband's parents); In re Marriage of Wolfe, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 921, 925 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001).
214. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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definition makes the other whole.
2 17
Applying formulaic law and economics to cases involving fundamental institutions,
the outcomes of which critically affect society, also poses some real problems for most of
us. We can say that contract or economic analyses cannot apply to such investments,2 18
that public goods overwhelm the private objects of contract (thus justifying
regulation). 2 19 For the family, this might translate into concluding that family law
somehow becomes a sphere in which commercial law never operates or in which
government always exerts an oversight role.
Further, though law and economics claims to be positive, so that all contracts are
equal, reality teaches us that some investments are not equal to others. Some investments
are so important they deserve government funding or the benefits given by the patent
system. Even if they remain purely private, some contracts have such wider social impact
that, when they fail, damages are not calculated in precisely the usual way. If one party or
one spouse invests in a venture that promises to benefit the economy as a whole, I argue
here that damages should not be limited to reliance losses. In situations in which timing
make returns asymmetric, somehow the party making the investment should recognize a
return to investment even when, without anyone's fault, the contract terminates.
David's and my conversation successfully traversed much of this territory, but I
failed to understand the greater social gain point until he was no longer around to
continue his end of the discussion. But, as the teacher that he was, he asked me the
questions that forced me to work the problem out on my own.
217. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 134-138 and accompanying text.
219. See Singer, supra note 192.
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